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Abstract 
This thesis aims at identifying the relationship between a company’s environmental and 
economic performance. Using an event study methodology, we study 125 environmental press 
releases on voluntary initiatives, awards and certifications from 43 companies listed in 
Norway and Sweden. Through both a univariate and a cross-sectional analysis, we find that 
although there is no overall relationship between environmental and economic performance, 
there are in fact differences related to the strength of the environmental press release; stronger 
announcements, with a higher environmental commitment, are met with a more negative 
reaction by investors than weaker ones. This suggests that investors believe that the benefits 
related to strong environmental performance will be more than offset by the corresponding 
costs. Further research should therefore aim to expand the understanding of when 
environmental policies are profitable, and under what circumstances they are unprofitable. 
This will clarify for managers which environmental policies to initiate, and for lawmakers 
what regulation is needed to protect the environment in a satisfactory way.  
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1. Introduction 
The last decades have seen an extensive discussion about the firm’s role in society; with much 
focus from companies, media, and researchers on corporate social responsibility and 
sustainable business practices. As many firms have extended their business to parts of the 
world where environmental laws are less stringent (or even non-existent) and civil rights are 
viewed from a different perspective, the importance of corporate social responsibility and 
sustainable business practices has been reinforced.  
How a firm acts in relation to its environment has in the last years become a significant part of 
its identity. In 1994, John Elkington (2006) introduced the concept of a triple bottom line, 
where performance in a company is measured on three dimensions: economically, socially 
and environmentally. This concept raises the question of whether there is a positive or 
negative relationship between the performances along these three dimensions. Although this 
study will focus on the relationship between the economic and environmental performance of 
firms, the social aspect of the triple bottom line should not be neglected.  
A multitude of theoretical and empirical studies have investigated the connection between a 
firm’s economic and environmental performance. While the first trend in the theoretical 
studies was that a company should take care of the environment only to the extent that it could 
save money on clean-up and litigation costs (Melnyk et al., 2003), later studies (e.g. Porter, 
1991, Hart, 1995) argued that companies which incorporate environmental responsibility into 
their corporate strategies could experience increased profits through sustained competitive 
advantage. More recent studies indicate that the relationship between economic and 
environmental performance depends on the policy; some environmental policies meet the 
profit criteria, others do not (Prakash, 2000). The empirical studies in the field also point in 
both directions; some studies have identified a clear positive relationship between 
environmental and economic performance (e.g. Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996, Al-Tuwaijri 
et al., 2004), while others have concluded just the opposite (e.g. Cañón-de-Francia and 
Garcés-Ayerbe, 2009, Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011). So although it has been widely 
studied, both theoretically and empirically, the relationship between economic and 
environmental performance remains ambiguous. 
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1.1. Objective and Research Question 
Our aim with this study is to further analyse the relationship between environmental and 
economic performance. The research question we seek to enlighten can be phrased in the 
following way: 
Is there a relationship between environmental and economic performance, and is there a 
difference related to the strength of the environmental announcement, or whether the firm is 
listed in Norway or Sweden? 
We approach this question using the event study methodology, which is an analysis of the 
cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR) that can be related to an event. After manually 
searching through 14 years of press archives on firm websites and Factiva (2012) from 185 
Swedish and Norwegian firms, we end up with 125 press releases/announcements about 
voluntary environmental plans and achievements. While several event studies have 
investigated the relationship between economic and environmental performance by linking it 
to a specific event, this study includes a variety of environmental announcements and 
distinguishes between them according to their characteristics. We categorize the 
announcements on two dimensions: according to the country in which the firm is listed, 
Norway or Sweden, and according to the strength. We define three categories of strength: 
weak, medium and strong. The strength of the announcements is defined by its degree of 
commitment and the novelty of the information. The categorizations are used to analyse 
whether environmental commitments perceived as strong, result in different cumulative 
abnormal returns than weaker commitments, and whether there is a difference depending on 
the country in which the company is listed.  
In order to test our hypotheses, we perform both a univariate and a cross-sectional analysis on 
cumulative abnormal returns that are related to the date of the press releases. In the cross-
sectional analysis we also divide the sample into three categories according to the type of the 
announcement: (a) environmental certifications and inclusions in sustainable and responsible 
investment (SRI) indices, (b) environmental awards, and (c) environmental initiatives. This 
analysis allows us to better identify the differences in cumulative abnormal returns related to 
the type, strength and country of the announcement, as well as other variables such as firm 
characteristics. 
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1.2. Summary of Findings 
We find that on the overall level, firms announcing an environmental plan or achievement 
experience no significant effect on the stock price. Although the overall average effect is 
slightly negative, it is not significant. Dividing the sample according to country of 
announcement provides no additional information. However, analysing the announcements in 
categories of strength, we find indications that medium and strong environmental 
commitments are associated with a negative cumulative abnormal return. The cross-sectional 
analysis supports the division into categories according to strength; we find that especially 
strong environmental announcements result in reduced cumulative abnormal return compared 
to other announcements. The results may reflect that investors expect stronger environmental 
commitments to be more costly than weak commitments. Weak announcements may improve 
customer satisfaction and firm reputation without imposing high costs on the firm, and thus 
neither decrease nor increase shareholder value. For the strong commitments on the other 
hand, investors seem to believe that the costs of the initiative will offset the positive effects on 
shareholder value.  
Seeing that investors react differently to firms’ environmental commitments depending on 
how strong the commitment is, we propose that the question “Does it pay to be green?” 
should be replaced by “When does it pay to be green?”. Further research should confirm the 
strength effect we have found, and then investigate whether all strong environmental 
commitments destroy shareholder value, or if strong environmental policies that meet the 
profit criteria exist, thus establishing a positive relation between the economic and 
environmental performance of the firm.  
1.3. Structure 
The thesis is built up in the following way: chapter 2 gives an overview of the existing 
literature on the relationship between economic and environmental performance; chapter 3 
provides a description of the event study methodology and of our dataset; chapter 4 presents 
and discusses the results from the two main analyses, while chapter 5 contains an overall 
conclusion of the thesis. The chapters are divided into sections and subsections.  
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Having raised a research question, we will now look at what previous researchers have found 
on this subject, and formulate precise hypotheses that we will later attempt to answer. Figure 
2.1 shows the environmental and economic performance in relation to the triple bottom line 
introduced by Elkington in 1994. 
 
 
The first section of this chapter will look at what theoretical connections there are between 
economic and environmental performance, classifying environmental policies into four 
distinct types according to whether they are mandated by regulation and whether they meet a 
profit criterion. The second section looks at which environmental and economic indicators 
that are generally used to test the relationship between environmental and economic 
performance, and what earlier studies have found on the subject. Based on the theoretical and 
Figure 2.1: Framework for chapter 2, numbers in italics indicate section and subsection where 
the subjects are discussed. 
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empirical findings, we will in the last section develop three distinct hypotheses on whether 
there is a connection at all, whether this connection varies between companies listed in 
Norway and Sweden, and whether it differs between strengths of environmental 
commitments.  
2.1. Theoretical Background 
The question “Does it pay to be green?” has in the last two decades been met with a host of 
both empirical and theoretical studies, ranging from short run (e.g. Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004, 
Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011, Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996), to long run (e.g. 
Nakamura, 2011, Ziegler et al., 2011) profitability studies and meta studies summarizing 
earlier findings and drawing broader conclusions (e.g. Ambec and Lanoie, 2008). We will 
here discuss the basis for studies such as these and the theoretical links that lead researchers to 
test whether protecting the environment may be profitable. 
The first studies trying to identify links between environmental and economic performance 
focused mainly on environmentally harmful events and their direct effect on market 
capitalization (e.g. Shane and Spicer, 1983). The prevailing view was that the environmental 
activity of a private company should represent a trade-off between the costs of being clean 
versus the costs of polluting, and the studies performed in this period were more interested in 
identifying the costs of polluting perceived by the market. The existence of externalities like 
clean air and water only imposed costs on the companies (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008). It was 
deemed that doing more for the environment than what would be saved in clean-up and 
litigation costs was inappropriate for companies and in conflict with their duty of maximizing 
shareholder value (Melnyk et al., 2003). Porter and van der Linde (1995a, 1995b) call this an 
“arm wrestling match” between the social costs of polluting and the private costs of 
prevention and clean-up. 
We have moved past this view of being either for or against the environment, and there are 
now several different views on why firms “go green” and how profitable this is. Prakash 
(2000) divides environmental policies into four types: those that (1) go beyond compliance 
and meet or exceed the profit criteria, (2) go beyond compliance and do not meet the profit 
criteria, (3) are required by law and meet or exceed the profit criteria, and (4) are required by 
law and do not meet the profit criteria. See figure 2.2 for a summary.  
Type 3 and Type 4 policies are required for all firms by law, so understanding why they are 
adopted is not very difficult; they are subsequently not further looked at here. Type 1 policies 
16 
 
are not required by law, but meet the profit criteria a firm will apply to any project it assesses. 
Type 2 policies, however, are neither mandated by law nor apparently profitable, and it is not 
easily understood why they are adopted. In the next two subsections we will look closely at 
the theories that explain why managers implement Type 1 and Type 2 policies.  
2.1.1. Policies That Meet the Profit Criteria 
The idea that firms should only carry out projects that exceed a decided internal rate of return 
in order to deliver shareholder value is founded in the neoclassical view of the firm. This view 
was neatly summarized by Friedman (1970), who claims that the social objective of business 
is only to maximize shareholders’ wealth. He calls any drive for social responsibility in 
business “pure and unadulterated socialism”, and  managers that dare for example reduce 
pollution more than what is required as “unwitting puppets of the intellectual forces that have 
been undermining the basis of a free society” (Friedman, 1970, p. 33). This view states that 
firms should only engage in environmental activities that are profitable, and by definition 
taking care of the environment was not seen as profitable.  
This view prevailed until the early 90’s, when the two first main proposals of a different view 
were presented: the Porter Hypothesis (Porter, 1991, Porter and van der Linde, 1995a, Porter 
and van der Linde, 1995b), and the natural-resource-based view of the firm (Hart, 1995, Hart 
These policies will always be executed as there is a credible 
threat of an economic penalty (making them de facto 
profitable) 
Two theories explain why 
these policies are enacted: 
- The Porter 
Hypothesis 
- The natural-
resource-based view 
of the firm 
Two sets of theories 
rationalize these policies: 
- Strategic 
motivations 
- Stakeholder or 
institutional pressure 
Policies that meet or exceed 
the profit criteria 
Policies that do not meet the 
profit criteria 
Policies mandated by 
regulation or law 
Beyond-compliance 
policies 
IV III 
II I 
Figure 2.2: Four different types of environmental policies. Theories on why they are 
enacted are listed in the boxes (Prakash, 2000). 
17 
 
and Dowell, 2011). The Porter Hypothesis, first proposed by Porter in 1991 and refined in two 
articles in 1995 (Porter and van der Linde, 1995a, Porter and van der Linde, 1995b) postulates 
that pollution is nothing but unnecessary waste for companies, which through proper 
innovation instead may be turned to a competitive advantage. Environmental activities such as 
a firm’s attempts to reduce transportation may give immediate profits through lower petrol 
costs, but also put the company at a competitive advantage should a larger tax on emissions be 
introduced. Porter and van der Linde (1995a, 1995b) support more environmental regulation 
(though more efficient than the current), giving companies an incentive to innovate more and 
at a higher speed. 
Approximately at the same time as the Porter Hypothesis was developed, Hart published an 
article proposing an extension of the resource-based view of the firm. This view considers the 
internal resources and capabilities of a firm in order to find an optimal strategy (Hart, 1995). 
By looking at the adverse development of the environment and climate, Hart suggests also 
taking into account the relationship of the firm to the natural environment in order to build 
competitive advantage. He argues that because businesses will be constrained by and 
dependent on the natural environment, they need to take this into account when building their 
strategy. Hart introduces a framework with three interdependent strategies which are able to 
build lasting dynamic capabilities: pollution prevention, product stewardship, and sustainable 
development. The most important strategy for our case (and the most researched) is the 
proactive pollution prevention. This is by nature opposite from the reactive pollution control, 
and is proven in the article (Hart, 1995) and by later research (summarized in Hart and 
Dowell, 2011) to be much more profitable. The problem is that managers do not find 
profitable pollution prevention opportunities if they do not look for them, so the ability to 
profit from such opportunities depends on the mind-set and expectations of the management 
to find them. So if firms change their attitudes, they will be able to create shareholder value 
by first picking the “low hanging fruit” and later building strategic capabilities that confer 
value to the company. Sharma and Vredenburg (1998) show how those oil and gas firms in 
Canada that had a proactive stance towards the environment and stakeholders, were over a 
long period able to build a strategic capability not easily imitable by others, which allowed 
them to better manage their waste reduction, energy conservation programs, and costs.  
2.1.2. Policies That Do Not Meet the Profit Criteria 
While the neoclassical view of the firm may describe why profitable environmental policies 
are adopted, there is not one single equivalent view of the firm to describe why managers 
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enact policies that are not profitable for the firm and the shareholders. Prakash (2000) 
identifies two sets of explanations for why these policies are adopted: strategic motivations 
and stakeholder/institutional pressure.  
The strategic explanations postulate that companies adopt the seemingly unprofitable 
environmental policies for long-term strategic reasons, for example to precede environmental 
regulation. Hart (1995) describes how BMW was able to convince German regulators that 
their car-recycling method was the best by developing one prior to the regulation process. 
Though the recycling programme was initially not profitable, it pre-empted regulation and 
forced the competitors to copy BMW’s process at a much higher cost. In the same manner, 
technologically advanced companies may create barriers to entry for new firms by designing 
capital-intensive environmentally friendly technology, and making it the industry standard 
(Prakash, 2000). Long-term strategic concerns may thus explain why companies adopt 
apparently unprofitable policies.  
The second set of explanations is based on stakeholder theory and sociological institutional 
theory – theories that are, respectively, based on the belief that the firm considers all 
stakeholders affected by their operations, or is influenced by other institutional groups. 
Common for both theories is that the firm acts on some non-profit goal that may or may not 
increase their long-term profits (Prakash, 2000). Though these theories may explain why 
firms adopt non-profitable environmental policies, they do not explain why not all firms adopt 
similar policies if they are “the right thing to do”. Most of Prakash’s book (2000) goes into 
answering this question, and after various case studies he posits that it is because these 
environmental policies are often not subject to formal investment appraisal processes, but 
more dependent on the organizational dynamics and key people in power. The profits from 
environmental investments are often difficult to assess, so instead of being a rigorous and 
neutral measurement, estimates of future profits become extensions of the personal opinions 
of various managers and employees. In summary, these theories propose that firms adopt 
unprofitable strategies because of differing personal views and organizational dynamics in 
different companies; not exactly a good starting point for rigorous numerical analysis. Prakash 
himself states that analysing this wearing the spectacles of neoclassical economists will give 
strange and varying results. 
Nonetheless, economists, environmentalists and financial researchers have for decades tried to 
identify a clear connection between the environmental and economic performance of 
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companies with varying results. In the next section we will look at what these researchers 
have discovered.  
2.2. Empirical Findings  
The difficulty of studying the relationship between environmental and economic performance 
of companies lies in finding good proxies for the two variables that are readily measurable. 
Some studies have applied a specific environmental event such as an environmental 
certification (e.g. Paulraj and de Jong, 2011), joining a voluntary environmental initiative (e.g. 
Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011), or being included in an environmental index (e.g. Wai 
Kong Cheung, 2011) as an indicator of total environmental performance. Other studies have 
used quantifiable but longer-term indicators such as the reporting on environmental issues 
(e.g. Ziegler et al., 2011, Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004) as a proxy for the environmental 
performance. Though more general and long-term indicators seem better, they also have to be 
matched with long-term economic indicators where it may be difficult to separate the effects 
of “going green” from other factors. Long-term economic indicators that have been used 
include Jensen’s α in CAPM and the four factor model (e.g. Ziegler et al., 2011) for portfolio 
studies, the book value of intangible assets (e.g. Konar and Cohen, 2001) and the return on 
assets (e.g. Nakamura, 2011) for regression studies, whereas the most common short-term 
indicator used are cumulative abnormal returns (e.g. Gilley et al., 2000, Cañón-de-Francia and 
Garcés-Ayerbe, 2009, Wai Kong Cheung, 2011). The following subsections will look closer 
at the different indicators of economic and environmental performance used, and the 
researched connection between them.  
2.2.1. The Economic Indicator 
There are numerous accounting and financial measures we can use as an indicator of the 
economic performance of a firm, but the problem is to have measures which give a  
meaningful comparison to the different environmental measures we will discuss in the next 
subsection. Several studies (e.g. Ambec and Lanoie, 2007, Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 
2011) argue that these measures can be grouped into three main categories: portfolio analysis, 
regression analysis, and event studies. While portfolio analyses and event studies generally 
look at stock returns from owning environmentally friendly firms, regression studies mostly 
study accounting profitability measures of the companies.  
Portfolio analysis studies (e.g. Ziegler et al., 2011) create their own subset of companies 
based on an environmental characteristic, or look at the performance of a socially responsible 
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fund or index created in a similar manner, and then compare the stock returns in this subset of 
companies with the returns of other funds or indices without the higher environmental or 
social standards. An inherent problem with such an analysis is to separate the effects of being 
environmentally friendly from other factors such as fund-manager skill and fund composition. 
The use of the four factor model by Carhart (1997) instead of CAPM alleviates many of these 
problems, but also makes the model much more complex and thus not much used. An initial 
argument is that the performance of these funds will be worse than comparable funds due to 
their restrictions on portfolio diversification (Aslaksen and Synnestvedt, 2003, Ziegler et al., 
2011). Ambec and Lanoie (2007) summarize the findings from 16 portfolio studies and find 
that 11 of these show no statistical difference between environmentally friendly and 
comparable funds or indices, while five of them conclude that environmentally funds 
outperform the conventional ones. Johnsen and Gjølberg (2009), on the other hand, find that 
socially responsible indices perform worse than the market because the restrictions imposed 
on them make them biased towards specific industries and markets. They also suggest that 
socially responsible funds with a positive selection criterion perform worse than those with a 
negative selection criterion.  
Regression analysis studies also allow researchers to look at the long-term effects of 
environmental friendliness. In contrast to the portfolio studies, however, these studies look at 
single firms and accounting measures, studying economic performance by Tobin’s Q, return 
on assets, return on sales, return on equity, or the value of intangible assets (Ambec and 
Lanoie, 2008, Konar and Cohen, 2001). A large multitude of such studies have been 
performed in the last two decades with very varying results. Ambec and Lanoie (2007) 
examine 12 studies that use regression analysis, nine of which find a positive relationship 
between economic and environmental performance, two of which are inconclusive, and one 
which postulates a negative relationship. Nakamura (2011), using ex ante firm environmental 
protection efforts, finds that there is a time lag between the investment and the increased firm 
return on assets; the author suggests that consumers value the investment only once it arrives 
in the market. However, this value diminishes with time and reverts to zero. He thus 
implicitly assumes that the heightened economic performance comes from consumer 
preferences and not directly from innovation and improved waste management; one of the 
main parts of the Porter Hypothesis. Konar and Cohen (2001), on the other hand, find that an 
increase in emissions of toxic chemicals significantly decreases the value of a firm.  
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Telle (2006) argues that the methods most often used in regression analysis studies suffer 
from several shortcomings, the most important being their lack of control for omitted 
unobserved variables. These variables could be firm-specific characteristics like management 
quality, employee motivation and specific regulatory environments. So even though a positive 
relationship has been found several times between long-term economic and environmental 
performance, it is not certain if it is the good financial results that allow for environmental 
investments or if it is the good environmental performance that leads to higher profitability. It 
may also be the case that an omitted variable, for example the management’s quality, affects 
both the economic and environmental results.  
The third way of measuring the economic performance of a firm is using short-term event 
studies. These studies examine what happens to the price of a stock in the days around an 
environmental event, above what you could usually expect from the stock. The event study 
methodology will be discussed in detail in chapter three. Again, Ambec and Lanoie (2007) 
have gathered the results for 14 such studies, and they find that for all studies an 
environmentally harmful (negative) event leads to a significant reduction in stock returns, and 
vice versa for environmentally beneficial (positive) events.  
Ambec and Lanoie (2007) criticize the event study methodology by arguing that for the stock 
to move, either day traders have to look for arbitrages based on the new environmental 
information, or long-term environmentally conscious investors have to buy (sell) the now 
“clean” (“dirty”) stock. Since they deem it unlikely that the first scenario is true, they turn to 
the second for an explanation. But if the second is true, the buying and selling of the stock by 
long-term investors is better measured by long-term indicators, thus rendering the event study 
methodology imprecise. However, Aslaksen and Synnestvedt (2003) argue that since 
environmentally conscious investors constitute a very small fraction of all investors, they will 
be more successful in bidding up the price of desirable stocks than they are in forcing down 
the price of undesirable stocks. Accepting this argument, the second explanation by Ambec 
and Laoie (2007)  of the movement in stock prices holds only for stock increases due to a 
positive event, but does not explain most event studies where stock prices decrease following 
a negative event. This does not support the suggestion of only socially conscious investors 
moving the stock following an environmental event, and therefore we cannot reject that day 
traders try to make profits from calculating the cash flow effects of the event. The stock price 
will then move very quickly, and the event study methodology can be appropriate.  
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Although many of the aforementioned studies conclude that being more environmentally 
friendly leads to higher profits, it is important to point out that some of these studies look for 
and find a fall in the economic indicator following a negative environmental event. Even 
though it is found that for example more pollution leads to a fall in the market value of a firm, 
this does not necessarily imply that the market value would increase following a decrease in 
pollution. Since we do not know whether the relationship is linear, a negative argument does 
not make a positive one.  
As explained in chapter 3, this study will apply the short-run methodology, looking for 
positive press releases by the company related to environmental commitments and connecting 
these with the short-term abnormal returns in the stock price of the company.  
2.2.2. The Environmental Indicator 
Where the financial and accounting measures are easily accessible proxies for the economic 
effect of going green, finding a proxy for the environmental performance is difficult.  
The first studies carried out in this field were generally reliant on data supplied by third 
parties such as the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) or the Toxic Release Inventory 
(TRI) by the US Environmental Protection Agency. Studies such as the one by Shane and 
Spicer (1983) mostly found, rather unsurprisingly, that there is a negative effect on the stock 
price when the market learns that a company pollutes much. These studies were however 
rather methodically imprecise, using crude and simplified event studies that have been proven 
statistically inferior to the methods described later in this thesis (Kolari and Pynnonen, 2011, 
McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).  
Environmental management systems (EMS), such as ISO 14001 and EMAS, have been used 
as an indicator of environmental performance by researchers since their introduction. ISO 
14001 was introduced in 1996 as an international standard for EMSs, facilitating the cross-
border understanding of environmental friendliness. Melnyk et al. (2003) test whether having 
an EMS improves overall performance for a firm, and whether certifying this system (for 
example through ISO 14001) improves performance even more. Through a survey of 
American managers, they find that both having and certifying the management system 
significantly increases performance for eight of ten indicators. Through an event study of 
firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange, Cañón-de-Francia and Garcés-Ayerbe (2009) find 
that the adoption of the ISO 14001 standard significantly reduces the market value of certain 
firms. Specifically, firms that are less internationalized and pollute less observe a more 
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negative stock price effect than other firms, indicating that investors expect the cost of 
implementing the EMS to outweigh any benefits when the firm is already a low polluter. 
Using a larger sample of American firms, Paulraj and Jong (2011) similarly find a negative 
stock price effect of ISO 14001 certification announcements when comparing the stock 
returns to matched control firms.  
Another environmental indicator that has been used by Wai Kong Cheung (2011) is the 
inclusion in sustainability indexes. Wai Kong Cheung tests whether an inclusion or exclusion 
in the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index is followed by a change in either stock return or 
risk, but finds no significant long-term effects. He does however identify a temporary increase 
(decrease) in stock returns on the day of the inclusion (exclusion), reflecting a temporary 
surge in demand, which stabilizes after a day and moves the stock back to pre-inclusion (pre-
exclusion) levels. 
Gilley et al. (2000) look for positive effects of environmental initiatives, but are not able to 
find a statistically significant connection. They do, however, find differences between 
process-driven and product-driven initiatives which seek to minimize the environmental 
impact of the firm’s processes and products, respectively. Product-driven initiatives are more 
easily observed by both the market and the consumer, and the researchers find that these 
create value for the company through a possible reputation enhancing effect. On the other 
hand, the process-driven environmental initiatives are not as visible to consumers, and are 
found by Gilley et al. to destroy value.  
Yet another indicator that has been used is the release of environmental reports by firms. A 
paper by Ziegler et al. (2011) looks at the relationship between having a “climate impact 
statement” and “released carbon reduction measures” and long-term stock returns. They find 
that although there is no overall gain from buying stocks that disclose their environmental 
performance and selling those that do not, the profitability of such a strategy has risen over 
time in Europe. In testing the relationship between economic and environmental performance, 
the authors take a detour via environmental reporting, without problematizing the relationship 
between environmental performance and reporting. Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004), in their review 
of prior research on the relationship between these three variables, find that the relationship 
between environmental performance and reporting has most often been found to be non-
significant, and at times contradictory. However, in their empirical analysis, the same authors 
find a positive and highly significant coefficient between the two variables, indicating that the 
assumptions by Ziegler et al. (2011) may be correct.  
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In deciding the proxy for environmental performance, it is important to distinguish between 
environmental initiatives that are voluntary, and those that are only a result of compliance. 
Using Prakash’s (2000) definition, introduced in the previous section, this is the same as the 
difference between the beyond-compliance policy types 1 and 2, versus the policy types 3 and 
4 which are only there in order to adhere to regulation. Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) 
argue that previously inconsistent results on the relationship between  economic and 
environmental performance can be explained by making this distinction, and show that only 
studies that choose an environmental measure tied to liability, compliance, and regulatory 
risks find a positive relationship. The prediction is that firms engaged in environmental 
activity to reduce risk or in response to liability or compliance claims will observe a positive 
effect of that activity, whereas firms engaged in environmental activity for any other purposes 
will destroy value. The authors find, by looking at voluntary environmental initiatives aimed 
at reducing carbon emissions, that the stock market effects are negative following press 
releases related to firms adopting the initiatives. From a managerial point of view, it is also 
more interesting to regard only voluntary initiatives, as it is here that managers have leeway to 
act.  
2.3. Hypothesis Development 
Earlier research has to a large extent focused on specific and detailed issues like for example 
the adoption of one specific EMS or a forest certification. However, in order to establish a 
relationship between economic and environmental performance that is of use to managers in 
Norway and Sweden today, it is necessary to look more broadly at environmental plans and 
achievements, and consider whether they are economically attractive in general.  
In order to avoid the positive bias in news announcements that are tied to liability, 
compliance, or regulatory risk, this paper will only look at environmental awards, 
certifications, and voluntary initiatives by a firm.  
Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995a, 1995b) postulated two decades ago that 
taking voluntary steps to reduce the impact of a firm’s actions on the environment could be a 
source of value. Radical changes have since occurred as to how companies are run, and 
managers now focus much more on environmental issues. A valid question now is if they 
focus too much; have they gone beyond the scope of merely preventing pollution first 
discussed by Porter? Is going green still profitable in Norway and Sweden, or have all the 
gains already been realized? This uncertainty is consistent with previous studies that have not 
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been very decisive in whether the relationship between economic and environmental 
performance is positive or negative (or even non-existent). To open for both possibilities, this 
thesis will be open for results in both directions by keeping two-sided hypotheses.  
We define an environmental announcement (or an environmental press release) as any press 
release or new disclosure concerning: the receipt of an environmental award; being/ planning 
to be environmentally certified; being included in a socially responsible index; initiating 
cooperation with an NGO on an environmental issue, or the commencement of other 
voluntary environmental initiatives. 
Our first hypothesis will look for any overall effects from the environmental press releases of 
all types in both Norway and Sweden to try to find the elusive answer to whether going green 
is profitable. 
H1: An environmental press release has no effect on the stock price of the firm concerned.  
H1A: An environmental press release has a positive or negative effect on the stock price of the 
firm concerned. 
Even if a general conclusion may be drawn from this first hypothesis, a more narrow question 
is not whether it pays to be green, but in which situations? It is possible that managers act in 
favour of the environment out of a personal conviction and set of values. Attitudes and values 
towards the environment may differ between Norway and Sweden, and consequently there 
may be differences in the reaction to environmental press releases.  
Table 2.1 shows the results of two World Values Survey (2005-2008) questions by 
respondents in Norway, Sweden, and the United States. It shows how Norway and Sweden 
are relatively similar in the perception of the dangers of global warming; 91.6% and 94.8%, 
respectively, believe that this is a very or somewhat serious world problem. Nevertheless, 
when it comes to prioritizing either economic growth or saving the environment, the countries 
differ somewhat – with 77.2% of Norwegians and 64.7% of Swedes preferring the 
environment. Any differences in reaction to relevant press releases may be a consequence of 
this. 
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Question posed Possible answers Country of response 
    Norway Sweden 
United 
States 
Environmental problems in 
the world: Global warming 
or the greenhouse effect. 
Very serious 58.50 % 64.30 % 48.50 % 
Somewhat serious 33.10 % 30.50 % 32.00 % 
Not very serious 6.50 % 4.90 % 13.30 % 
Not serious at all 1.90 % 0.30 % 6.30 % 
Total answers 1014 989 1213 
Protecting environment vs. 
Economic growth 
Protecting environment 77.20 % 64.70 % 54.10 % 
Economy growth and 
creating jobs 20.90 % 33.50 % 45.90 % 
Other answer 1.90 % 1.80 % 0 
Total answers 1013 981 1209 
 
The table also shows how both Norway and Sweden differ significantly from the United 
States with respect to acknowledging global warming and prioritizing the environment over 
economic growth – Americans prefer economic growth to a much larger extent than the two 
Scandinavian countries. Most of the earlier research has been done in the United States, but 
since our study focuses only on Norway and Sweden, our conclusions may be different due to 
these varying values. We can formulate our second hypothesis: 
H2: The stock market reaction following an environmental press release is the same for 
companies listed in Norway and in Sweden. 
H2A: The stock market reaction following an environmental press release differs between 
companies listed in Norway and in Sweden. 
Earlier event studies have generally looked at merely one or two types of press releases (e.g. 
Melnyk et al., 2003, Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011), making it possible to isolate the 
effect of that specific type of news announcement. When looking at all types of voluntary 
public disclosures, it is therefore important to classify the announcements in order to examine 
the perceived differential performance of different types of environmental initiatives (Gilley 
et al., 2000). We will here classify the announcements into three categories according to how 
environmentally “strong” they are. Though it is probable that all categories show a 
relationship in the same direction but of different size with regards to strength, it is possible 
that the markets react in a different manner to weak environmental initiatives that demand less 
investment, than to stronger and more expensive initiatives.  
Table 2.1: Perceptions of and attitudes towards the environment. 
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The third hypothesis is therefore: 
H3: Environmental press releases of different strengths have the same effect on the stock price 
of a company.  
H3A: Environmental press releases of different strengths do not have the same effect on the 
stock price of a company. 
With these three hypotheses to test, we now move on to collecting and summarizing the data 
used.  
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3. Method and Data 
Taking environmental responsibility has become more and more popular for companies the 
last couple of decades, but researchers have not yet been able to identify a clear relationship 
between economic and environmental performance. This unclear relationship has led us to 
three research questions concerning the overall relationship, differences between Norway and 
Sweden, and how the strengths of the press releases may affect the stock price.  
To answer these questions in a rigorous and quantitative manner, we need to use a precise and 
acknowledged methodology – in this case the event study – in a transparent and 
understandable way. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to describe (1) the method, its 
prerequisites and advantages, (2) how we have applied the method in this specific case along 
with any assumptions made, (3) the sample used and the data collected, and (4) which 
statistical tests have been used in assessing the collected data. This is also the manner in 
which the chapter is organized, starting with an introduction to the event study methodology.  
3.1. The Event Study Approach 
We have in this thesis applied the event study methodology, examining the effect of an 
unanticipated economic event on firm value, measured through the price of publicly listed 
common equity.  
In this setting, an event is considered as anything that leads to disclosure of new relevant 
information (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). The price of a security is in general the 
discounted value of all (expected) future cash flows, and an event that changes the market’s 
expectation of future cash flows to a firm should therefore be followed by a change in the 
security price. Given that markets are efficient, the effect of an economic event should be 
captured in the security price immediately (MacKinlay, 1997). Although event studies may be 
performed on different types of securities, the most frequent approach is to perform it on 
common equity (MacKinlay, 1997). That is also the approach in this study.  
In the event study, the return on a security during a specified period around the time of 
announcement (generally called the event window), is compared to the return which should be 
expected absent of any news announcement. This “abnormal return” is defined as the excess 
return above the expected return, and is assumed to capture the market’s response to new 
information (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Generally, the abnormal return can be expressed 
as: 
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            [         ] 
Where       is the abnormal return of press release i at time t,      is the actual return, 
 [         ] is the expected or normal return, and    is the conditioning information for the 
normal return model (Campbell et al., 1997). t is a day index where the announcement day 
takes the value of zero, preceding days are negative, and consequent ones are positive.  
In the previous chapter we presented three methods for studying the relationship between 
economic and environmental performance: portfolio analysis, regression analysis, and long-
term regression studies. We have chosen to perform our analysis using the event study 
methodology because it is the analysis which most securely isolates the specific effect of 
information regarding environmental performance reaching the investors. Longer term 
analysis would be prone to omitted unobserved variables, and would require the use of a 
complex four factor model and a larger and more diversified dataset. 
The weakness of a short-term model is, however, that it builds heavily on one assumption: 
that markets are efficient. In order for an unanticipated event to have an impact on the stock 
price of a company, investors have to be actively buying and selling the stock following new 
information. The assumption of efficient markets is therefore a crucial one in an event study. 
3.1.1. The Efficient Market Hypothesis  
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that security prices should at all times fully 
reflect all available information (Fama, 1970), and this is an important underlying assumption 
in the use of event studies (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).  
It is common to distinguish between three forms of market efficiency: weak form, semi-strong 
form, and strong form. Weak form efficiency refers to markets where the security price 
reflects all past prices and price movements, semi-strong form efficiency to markets in which 
the price reflects all publicly available information, and strong form efficiency to markets 
where all both private and public information is reflected in security prices (Fabozzi, 2009).  
While strong form efficiency implies that inside information, i.e. information not yet 
published, is available to all investors, semi-strong efficiency only assumes that all published 
information is available to all investors (Scott, 1995). From these definitions, and in line with 
Fabozzi’s (2009) classification of the U.S. stock market, we assume that the Scandinavian 
stock markets are semi-strong form efficient. The only factor that speaks against this 
assumption is that the Scandinavian markets are much smaller, and have lower trading 
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frequency, than the more efficient US market. However, this alone is not enough to classify 
the Swedish and Norwegian markets as weak-form efficient, so the assumption still holds.  
3.2. Details of the Event Study and Our Approach  
We have seen that the event study measures short-term stock returns following an 
unanticipated event, and that market efficiency is an important assumption. In order to have 
reliable and verifiable results, we will show how the event study methodology has been used 
in this thesis. Specifically, we will describe how and which returns have been used; which 
types of environmental announcements (unanticipated events) we have measured; how we 
have dealt with several news announcements (confounding effects) at once; for how long an 
event window we have measured the returns, and, finally, how we have categorized the 
announcements to find any differential effects.  
3.2.1. Abnormal Returns – Quantifying the Stock Returns 
As defined earlier, the abnormal return is the excess return over the expected or normal return 
on a security. What defines expected or normal returns on a stock is not a fact given in the 
market, but can be calculated using one of two categories of models: statistical models or 
economic models (Campbell et al., 1997). 
While the statistical models rely on statistical assumptions about the behaviour of security 
returns, economic models are based on assumptions about investors’ behaviour. However, 
statistical assumptions are also often necessary for the economic models, rendering them 
inferior to statistical models. Among the statistical models are the constant-mean-return 
model, the market model, and the factor model; while the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) and versions of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) are examples of economic 
models (Campbell et al., 1997).  
This study uses the market model, which predicts an expected return based on the correlation 
of the stock return with the market return in an estimation period. The multifactor model also 
predicts a return based on historical correlations, but takes into consideration several factors 
(MacKinlay, 1997). According to Campbell et al. (1997), there is little difference in using a 
multifactor model instead of the market model to determine normal performance in event 
studies. The reason is that variables other than the market return have little explanatory power 
in such a short period of time, and thus contribute to only marginally reducing the variance in 
the abnormal return.  
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In this study, the approach used to calculate expected return is the market model: 
 
                    
where 
      =  the stock return related to press release i at time t 
          =  the intercept for press release i from the estimation period 
           =  the correlation between the return on the stock and the return on the market 
during the estimation period of press release i 
      =  the return on market at time t 
       =  the residual in the regression model for press release i at time t 
In order to estimate the most accurate expected return for companies listed in Norway or 
Sweden, we utilize two different indices to approximate the market return. The return on the 
All Share Gross Index (OSEBX) is used as the market return for Norwegian-listed companies, 
while the return on the SIX Return Index
1
 (SIXRX) is used for Swedish-listed companies. 
These indices are both gross return indices, meaning that dividends are assumed to be 
reinvested in the index. In order for the individual stock returns to be comparable to these 
indices, we also use dividend-adjusted stock prices for all companies. Stock prices and the 
corresponding value of the market index are retrieved from Macrobond (2012). The returns 
are calculated as continuous returns:  
     (
  
    
) 
where    is today’s closing price and        is yesterday’s closing price.  
The market model is estimated during a period prior to the event window – the estimation 
period. The estimation period ends before the start of the event window in order to exclude 
the possible abnormal returns caused by the event. It is common to use an estimation period of 
around 250 days, which is approximately the number of trading days in a calendar year 
(Corrado, 2011). In line with Corrado (2011) and Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011), we 
have used an estimation period of 251 days.  
                                                     
1 We had initially planned to use OMXSGI (OMX Stockholm Gross Index) for the Swedish-listed companies, but since this 
index was not listed until 28.12.2007 we have chosen to use the SIXRX instead. There is, however, perfect correlation  
(99.99 %) between the two indices since that date. 
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We estimate the market model for each press release using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression. Using OLS to estimate    and   , we assume the following (Patell, 1976): 
 (    )    
   (         )  {
         
  
         
 
   (         )                           
This means that the error term      has an expectation of zero; there is no autocorrelation 
(correlation in the error term      though time), and no endogeneity (correlation between the 
error term      and the explanatory variable     ). s and v are days in the estimation period, 
  and    is the start and end day of the estimation period, respectively, and n is the number of 
press releases. Using the estimated alpha and beta from the market model, the expected return 
on day t of press release i is given by:  
 [         ]   ̂   ̂      
The abnormal return (AR) on day t for press release i in the event window is then the 
difference between the actual return,       and the expected return  [         ]: 
  ̂         ( ̂   ̂     ) 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) related to press release i is just the sum of abnormal 
returns over all days in the event window: 
   ̂          ∑   ̂   
  
    
 
where    and     is the start and end day of the event window, respectively. CAR is the key 
measure we will use to assess the extraordinary stock returns following the unanticipated 
news announcement.  
The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR), the average CAR over all press releases, in 
the event window [       is then: 
    ̂       
 
 
∑   ̂        
 
   
 
When summing the CARs of the press releases, it is assumed that there is no correlation 
between the abnormal returns related to the different announcements (Campbell et al., 1997). 
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3.2.2. Types of Corporate Disclosures Studied 
Our study analyses the effect of environmental announcements on firm value. In order to 
detect whether the effect varies across categories of announcements, we have chosen to 
include press releases concerning different types of environmental plans and achievements. 
The approach to environmental action varies from industry to industry, and by including 
several types of environmental announcements, we might get observations from more 
industries than we otherwise would have had.  
The types of announcements included are environmental certifications, awards for 
environmental responsibility, inclusion in environmental and sustainability indices, NGO 
cooperation, and voluntary environmental initiatives such as CO2 reductions and improved 
waste management. Contract announcements are included when the company in question 
enters a contract to buy new equipment and stresses that the equipment is environmentally 
friendly. Sales contracts are assumed to have an unequivocal positive impact on earnings after 
tax, and are therefore excluded from the analyses. Reporting on environmental policy, 
emissions, pollution, etc. is only included if the reporting is recognized and awarded.  
3.2.3. Confounding Effects 
A critical assumption in the event study methodology is that there are no confounding effects 
from other events (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Confounding events are other events that 
have a potential effect on the security price. To ensure that a change in the security price is 
related to the event studied, announcements with confounding events within the event window 
are removed from the sample.  
To control for confounding effects, we have excluded press releases for which there have 
been Factiva press releases during the event window on declaration of dividends, earnings or 
credit announcements, takeover bids, merger negotiations, changes in key executives, 
restructuring, joint ventures, major contract awards, significant liability suits, and 
announcements of major new products. The result is that the number of press releases 
remaining in each event window varies, with most press releases in the shortest event window 
and fewest in the longest event window.  
3.2.4. Event Window Length 
Several factors affect the choice of event window length, i.e. how long we assume it takes for 
the new information to be fully reflected in the stock price. Among these are the Efficient 
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Market Hypothesis, confounding effects, and uncertainty about when information becomes 
publicly available.  
The Efficient Market Hypothesis gives support to a short event window because it suggests 
that new information is rapidly reflected in the security price. Additionally, the longer the 
event window gets, the more difficult it is to control for confounding effects (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 1997). Both these factors provide support for choosing a shorter event window.  
In order to take into account the effects of announcements made after the closing of the stock 
market, the event window is often expanded to include the day after the announcement day 
(Campbell et al., 1997). Days prior to the announcement day may also be included in the 
event window to ensure that possible leakages of information are captured in the security 
returns. Another reason for including days before or after the announcement day is that there 
might be uncertainties around when the information is publicly available (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 1997).  
This study looks at three different event windows: The first includes the announcement day
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and the day after, [0,1], the second includes also a day before, [-1,1], and the third includes 
two days prior to the announcement as well as two days after, [-2,2]. The estimation period 
starts at t = -253 and ends at t = -3, where t= 0 is the announcement day. 
3.2.5. Categorization 
In order to get a better understanding of our data, we divide the press releases according to 
two main dimensions: country of listing and strength of the announcement. The country of 
listing can either be Norway or Sweden, and we define three categories of strength: weak, 
medium, and strong. We also introduce an additional dimension by determining whether the 
announcement is an award, a certification, or an initiative.  
Press releases are allocated into categories of strength according to the commitment of the 
press release and the novelty of the information in the press release. The greater the 
commitment or prestige involved and the more new information it carries, the stronger the 
press release is considered. It is for example not as impressive to be included in the same 
sustainability index twice. The reason for categorizing the data according to their strength is 
that we hypothesize strong announcements to have greater impact on firm value than weak 
announcements.  
                                                     
2 American press releases and articles are moved to the day after the American announcement date, when trading resumes in 
Europe, while Asian press releases are registered on the same day. There are four American and five Asian press releases in 
the sample.  
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Environmental awards are conferred by independent organizations to the company due to 
superior environmental performance. Awards are categorized according to their prestige and 
geographical dimension. International awards are categorized as strong, national as medium, 
and local as weak. Awards that have been received before are downgraded for each time the 
award is received. Awards received by subsidiaries are also downgraded.  
Certifications of whole firms that are either planned or achieved are categorized as medium, 
while certifications on subsidiary level are categorized as weak. Inclusions in sustainability 
indices also count as certifications. If they are global, they are categorized as medium, while 
inclusions in national indices are categorized as weak. No inclusions in sustainability indices 
are categorized as strong. If the company has been included again after having been excluded 
for a period of time, the inclusion is downgraded.  
Planned or achieved environmental initiatives are sorted into the categories weak, medium, 
and strong according to their concreteness and degree of commitment. An environmental 
initiative is considered as anything the company voluntarily does to reduce its environmental 
impact or improve environmental conditions. In order to classify as a strong initiative, the 
results of the initiative must be measurable, and the initiative must be concrete with regards to 
the period over which the results have been, or will be, achieved. Concrete planned or 
achieved initiatives on subsidiary level are categorized as medium. Non-concrete plans or 
achievements on firm level are also downgraded to medium. Cooperations with NGOs are 
categorized as weak unless the cooperation will be a large investment for the firm.  
Table 3.1 summarizes our categorization of announcements: 
Strong Medium Weak 
Concrete environmental 
initiative on firm level. 
International awards. 
 
Concrete environmental 
initiative on subsidiary level. 
Non-concrete initiative on firm 
level. 
Prestigious certification. 
National awards. 
Inclusion in global 
sustainability index. 
Certification of plant. 
Local awards. 
Inclusion in national 
sustainability index. 
Re-inclusion in global 
sustainability index. 
Cooperation with NGO. 
 
Table 3.1: Strength categorization. 
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3.3. Sample Selection and Data Description 
We have described the event study and how this has been used for gathering data. It is now 
appropriate to present the press releases found, the companies that released them, and other 
important measures.  
3.3.1. Sample Selection 
The sample used in the study comprises 125 press releases from companies listed in Norway 
and Sweden during the period from March 1998 to January 2012. All companies are either 
listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslo Børs), the Stockholm Stock Exchange 
(Stockholmsbörsen, OMX Stockholm), or both. Although the companies on these exchanges 
originate from countries around the world, we will refer to them as Norwegian and Swedish 
companies.  
Norwegian companies are from the indices OBX and OB Match, whereas Swedish companies 
are from the index OMX Stockholm 60. These indices were chosen to ensure liquidity in the 
shares, which is important for the share price to fully capture the market’s response to the 
event. In cases where a company had more than one share listed on the index, the most liquid 
share was used.  
Press releases were found by searching for environmental announcements in the press 
archives on the web sites of the 185 companies on the three indices. We also searched Factiva 
(2012) for press releases from these companies, limiting our search using keywords such as 
environmental, ISO 14001, emissions, CO2. In all, we found 170 press releases regarding 
environmental initiatives, certifications, or awards. 45 of these were eliminated due to 
confounding events or lack of stock data. In the final sample, 125 press releases from 43 
companies were included. 
As pointed out by Patell (1976), there is a bias of self-selection in this type of event studies: 
Only those companies which announce their environmental initiatives are included in the 
study.  
3.3.2. Description of Final Dataset 
The final dataset consists of 125 press releases from 43 Norwegian and Swedish companies 
listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange and Stockholm Stock Exchange. A full description of all 
press releases is given in Appendix A. 
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Table 3.2 shows how the press releases are distributed over companies and sectors. Some 
companies appear more than once in the sample of press releases and are thus overrepresented 
compared to companies with only one press release in the sample. This creates a potential 
source of bias in our sample. 
The majority of the press releases in the sample (73 %) come from firms within the sectors of 
consumer discretionary, consumer staples, industrials and materials. These are sectors that 
tend to pollute more, and might therefore be more concerned about reducing their 
environmental impact or improving their reputation in this area than companies in less 
polluting sectors, such as the health care sector.  
GICS sector Number of 
Press 
releases 
Number of 
Companies 
Average 
press 
releases per 
company 
Minimum 
press 
releases per 
company 
Maximum 
press 
releases per 
company 
Consumer Discretionary 19 5 3.8 1 13 
Consumer Staples 20 4 5 1 13 
Energy 7 5 1.4 1 2 
Financials 7 3 2.3 1 5 
Health Care 3 2 1.5 1 2 
Industrials 37 12 3.1 1 8 
Information Technology 11 5 2.2 1 5 
Materials 15 5 3 1 5 
Telecommunication Services 6 2 3 3 3 
Total sample 125 43 2.9 1 13 
 
Table 3.3 presents financial and sector information about the firms related to each of the press 
releases in the sample. The information is divided according to the categories of strength and 
country. The market value of equity is reported as of the last day in the estimation period (at  
t = -3), while total sales and market-to-book value are reported as of the last day in the last 
quarter before the event window. Sales are thus quoted in only the last quarter before the 
event. We choose to use quarterly sales because this number is readily accessible and better 
reflects the size of the company at the time of the event than a longer time period would. The 
data is gathered from Macrobond (2012), Børsprosjektet (NHH, 2012) and firm annual 
reports.  
 
 
Table 3.2: Distribution of press releases over companies and sectors. 
 
38 
 
      Total sample Weak Medium Strong 
Number of press releases 125 66 46 13 
    Norway 41 20 18 3 
    Sweden 84 46 28 10 
              
Market value of equity at t=-3 (bn NOK)         
  Mean 61.4 56.5 66.7 67.6 
    Norway 41.9 29.6 56.8 34.7 
    Sweden 70.9 68.2 73.0 77.5 
  Median 32.7 31.1 39.2 27.8 
    Norway 6.5 6.5 5.3 5.7 
    Sweden 38.5 34.0 46.8 27.7 
              
Sales, quarterly (bn NOK)         
  Mean 19.4 17.9 20.9 21.5 
    Norway 9.2 6.0 12.9 8.1 
    Sweden 24.3 23.0 26.1 25.6 
  Median 12.4 11.5 11.8 11.1 
    Norway 4.34 3.65 4.75 4.7 
    Sweden 21.6 20.4 22.4 23.0 
              
Market-to-book ratio         
  Mean 2.03 1.95 2.24 1.68 
    Norway 2.35 2.16 2.66 1.79 
    Sweden 1.87 1.85 1.98 1.65 
  Median 1.50 1.43 1.58 1.54 
    Norway 1.48 1.45 1.49 1.73 
    Sweden 1.52 1.41 1.66 1.47 
 
There are twice as many press releases from Sweden than from Norway: While there are 41 
press releases gathered from Norway, there are 84 from Sweden. Sample companies on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange releasing environmental announcements have lower market value of 
equity than sample companies on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. This might indicate that 
Swedish companies taking environmental action are in general larger than Norwegian 
companies taking such action, but most likely it is a reflection of the composition of the 
Norwegian and Swedish stock exchanges. A company listed on the Stockholm stock exchange 
has on average almost twice the market cap of one listed in Oslo (Macrobond, 2012). The 
quarterly sales show approximately the same as the market value of equity. The market-to-
book is on average larger in Norway than Sweden, but the medians are approximately equal. 
Table 3.3: Selected financial data of sample companies. 
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of press releases over country and year. 
 
This indicates that Norway has a few very high growth firms, but that the “normal” company 
is no different in this regard than Swedish companies.  
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of environmental press releases over the years 1998 to 2011. 
Although the number of press releases went down in 2010, the overall trend seems to be 
positive. There seems to be no overall trend in the number of press releases in each strength 
category.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 shows how press releases from Norwegian and Swedish companies have evolved 
over time. While the first observations of Swedish companies are from 1998 and peak in 
2009, the first observations of Norwegian companies are from 2003 and continue to grow.  
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of press releases over strength and year. 
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3.4. Statistical Methodology 
In order to study the relationship between environmental and economic performance, we need 
statistical tests that give robust and reliable results. Before presenting these, however, we 
identify which tests are suitable based on whether the data is normally distributed or not. This 
section is therefore divided into three subsections: The first will test for normality of stock 
returns, while the other two will present the two statistical approaches, univariate and cross-
sectional analysis, that are used to test the hypotheses developed in the preceding chapter. 
3.4.1. Normality of Stock Returns 
It is generally assumed that logarithmic stock returns are normally distributed (Campbell et 
al., 1997), an assumption that allows us to use parametric methods to test our hypotheses. 
However, this assumption is easily violated, and it is therefore important to test whether it 
holds for our dataset or not. 
We test the normality assumption by testing the distributions of CAR for the total sample and 
for the country and strength categories. The tests are performed for all three event windows. 
Table 3.4 shows the results of two commonly used statistical tests with a null hypothesis of 
normal distribution: the Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data, and the skewness/ kurtosis test 
for normality, calculated in Stata version 12 (StataCorp, 2011). Selected frequency plots are 
presented in Appendices B.1 to B.3.  
The Shapiro-Wilk W test is a strong test (Royston, 1995) of departure from normality, first 
proposed by Shapiro and Wilk in 1965, and later developed by several authors (e.g. Pearson et 
al., 1977). W can be interpreted as a measure of the straightness of the line in a probability 
plot, and any departure from normality is shown by a low p-value. The skewness/ kurtosis test 
for normality is based on a chi-square test that combines testing if the skewness and kurtosis 
alone deviate from a those of a standard normal distribution; zero and three, respectively 
(StataCorp, 2011). Our findings are consistent with Campbell et al. (1997), who state that for 
short horizons historical returns show weak evidence of skewness and strong evidence of 
excess kurtosis (fat tails).  
Both tests in table 3.4 indicate that the distributions of the CAR for the total sample, the 
Sweden sample, and the weak sample in the [0,1] window significantly deviate from the 
normal distribution. The Shapiro-Wilk W test also shows evidence of non-normality in the 
Norway sample for this window. All these tests are significant on the 1 % level. For the full 
sample, the skewness/kurtosis test indicates non-normality on the 10 % level for all event 
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windows. This does not necessarily mean that all parametric tests are invalid, but that we need 
to check their results using also non-parametric methods. 
      
Shapiro-
Wilk W test 
for normal 
data 
Skewness/ Kurtosis test for Normality 
  
Sample Event window Observations W Skewness Kurtosis chi^2   
Full sample               
  [0,1] 125 0.959*** 0.834 4.413 15.46***   
  [-1,1] 115 0.980 0.236 4.167 5.71*   
  [-2,2] 86 0.981 0.378 3.908 5.15*   
Norway               
  [0,1] 41 0.921*** 0.685 2.436 4.19   
  [-1,1] 39 0.962 0.013 4.766 4.67*   
  [-2,2] 31 0.975 0.360 2.506 1.04   
Sweden               
  [0,1] 84 0.943*** 0.898 5.979 16.65***   
  [-1,1] 76 0.979 0.366 3.789 4.39   
  [-2,2] 55 0.982 -0.205 3.142 0.90   
Weak               
  [0,1] 66 0.921*** 1.137 4.653 13.93***   
  [-1,1] 59 0.957** 0.621 4.370 7.32**   
  [-2,2] 46 0.977 0.178 3.709 2.24   
Medium               
  [0,1] 46 0.980 0.377 2.726 1.38   
  [-1,1] 43 0.967 -0.186 3.837 2.61   
  [-2,2] 28 0.955 0.379 2.762 1.00   
Strong               
  [0,1] 13 0.982 0.032 3.136 0.87   
  [-1,1] 13 0.928 -0.237 1.701 2.67   
  [-2,2] 12 0.940 -0.666 2.764 2.06   
* p-value < 0.10;   ** p-value < 0.05;   *** p-value < 0.01         
All tests are two-sided.             
 
In order to compare two groups with a two-sided parametric test, we also need to identify 
whether the variance in the CAR is the same in two groups. As such a test is needed to test 
hypothesis number 2, we need to check whether the CARs in the Norway sample and the 
Sweden sample have the same variance. This is done with a traditional F-test (where the null-
hypothesis is equal variances) in Stata (StataCorp, 2011), and the results are presented in table 
3.5.  
 
Table 3.4: Normal distribution tests for categories and event windows. 
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  P-values  
Event window σ(S) < σ(N) σ(S) ≠ σ(N) σ(S) > σ(N) 
[0,1] 0.8842 0.2315 0.1158 
[-1,1] 0.6760 0.6481 0.3240 
[-2,2] 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
The table shows that the p-value of greater variance in Swedish returns than in Norwegian 
returns is practically zero for the longest event window, indicating that the variance is indeed 
larger for the Swedish returns in this event window. For the shorter event windows, such a 
difference in the variance of returns cannot be proven. Nevertheless, in order to allow for the 
possibility that the variances are in fact different, we will choose a test that opens for unequal 
variances. This only means that we need to choose an appropriate parametric test-estimator in 
the comparison in the next subsection; it will have no effect on the non-parametric tests.  
3.4.2. Applied Tests for Univariate Analysis 
The univariate analysis is one of two methods we use to test our hypothesis of an effect of 
environmental press releases on a company’s stock price. Table 3.6 shortly describes the eight 
statistical univariate tests that are applied. The first three tests are used to test the hypothesis 
of zero effect, while the next five are tests used for comparisons of subgroups. A full 
description of the tests can be found in Appendix C. The ANOVA test assumes equal 
variances in the compared groups. We test this assumption using Bartlett’s test of equal 
variances which is described in detail in Appendix C.4. 
3.4.3. Methodology for Cross-Sectional Analysis 
The univariate analysis focuses on whether the CAAR differs from zero and whether there is a 
difference between the CAAR for observations in different country and strength categories. 
Elaborating the analysis with a multiple regression allows us to investigate how the CAR 
varies across different types of environmental announcements and identify factors that can 
explain the variation over press releases in the CAR. We choose to use the medium-long 
event window, [-1,1], in the regression analysis, and the dependent variable is therefore  
   ̂[     .  
 
 
 Table 3.5: Test of equal variance for Norway and Sweden sample. 
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Test name Test description 
Tests of zero effect   
    
Patell-Z A test developed by James Patell (1976), commonly used in event 
studies. Based on normally distributed returns, the student-t distribution 
and the central limit approximation. 
    
Generalized sign test 
(Cowan-Z) 
A non-parametric test counting positive vs. negative observations and 
comparing them to the pre-event ratio (Cowan, 1992). 
    
Generalized rank test 
(GRANK-T) 
An extension of the ordinary rank test which allows for robust analyses 
of event windows longer than one day. Also accounts for event-induced 
volatility (Kolari and Pynnonen, 2011). 
  
 Tests of comparison   
    
Two-sided t-test A regular t-test for comparison of two groups, assuming unequal 
variances (Newbold et al., 2010). 
    
Wilcoxon rank sum 
test 
A non-parametric test which compares the medians of the two 
populations and checks if they deviate significantly (Newbold et al., 
2010). 
    
Analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) 
Normal analysis of variance testing whether all means are the same, 
extension of two-sided t-test (StataCorp, 2011). 
    
Scheffe’s multiple 
comparison 
Compares the means of the variables one at a time. Recommended over 
other multiple comparison tests by Wesolowsky (1976). 
    
Kruskal-Wallis In the same way that ANOVA is the extension of the two-sided t-test, 
Kruskal-Wallis is an extension of the Wilcoxon rank sum test (Mickey et 
al., 2004). 
    
     
To analyse how the CAR varies with strength, country and other factors, we use a multiple 
regression. Our data is cross-sectional, meaning that the dataset is one-dimensional and that 
all subjects (press releases) are measured only once. The market model we use to calculate 
expected returns (see section 3.2.) does not explain the same amount of variation in the 
estimation period returns for the different press releases. The result is that the precision of the 
expected returns in the event window varies over the press releases, leading to varying 
precision in the CAR. In order to control for these differences in precision, we use a weighted 
least squares (WLS) regression. Instead of weighing each observation equally (which is the 
approach in the OLS regression), each observation is here weighted according to the inverse 
of its standard deviation of the residual from the market model. This type of weighing ensures 
Table 3.6: Summary of univariate tests. 
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that less precise observations are given less importance than more precise observations. See 
Appendix D for the WLS assumptions.  
3.4.3.1. Model Building and Misspecification 
The optimal regression model includes factors that make economic sense (Studenmund, 2006) 
and which for a given number of independent variables provides the maximum adjusted R-
squared
3
, meaning that it best explains the variation in the dependent variable (Freund et al., 
2006).  
Two common errors in the specification of a regression model are to omit relevant variables 
and to include irrelevant variables (Wooldridge, 2009). Omitted variable bias arises when a 
relevant independent variable is left out of the regression, and the effect of that variable on the 
dependent variable is captured by the coefficients of independent variables included in the 
regression (Greene, 2008). Over-specification means including variables in the regression 
model that do not contribute to explaining the variance in the dependent variable (Freund et 
al., 2006). Over-specification does not cause biased estimators, but it can however increase 
the variance of the estimators and thus the conclusions drawn about the significance of the 
model coefficients (Wooldridge, 2009).  
3.4.3.2. Dummy Variables and Interaction Terms 
In order to study the effect of categorical and ordinal variables on the dependent variable in a 
regression, the use of dummy variables and interaction terms is very convenient. A dummy 
variable takes the value of one if the observation is in the particular category, and otherwise 
zero (Greene, 2008). Introducing dummy variables in our regression lets us analyse the 
difference in cumulative abnormal returns related to one specific type of environmental 
announcements, by allowing the constant in the regression to be divergent for different 
categories of announcements. If we include interaction terms in the regression, also the slope 
may vary over categories of announcements. An interaction term is used when the effect of 
two or more independent variables on the dependent variable is not additive, or when the 
effect of one of the independent variables on the dependent variable depends on the level of 
another independent variable (Mickey et al., 2004). By introducing interaction terms in our 
regression, we can thus analyse the marginal effect of a variable when the observation is in a 
particular category (Wooldridge, 2009).  
                                                     
3 Coefficient of determination. 
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3.4.3.3. Variables in Multiple Regression 
The theory on omitted variable bias and over-specification highlights the importance of 
defining a good regression model. With this goal we will base our choice of variables on 
previous studies as well as economic theory and intuition. We will then consider which of 
these variables seems best to explain the variation in cumulative abnormal returns, measured 
by the coefficient of determination.  
In order to test hypothesis 2 about differences in CAR related to the country in which the firm 
is listed, we introduce a dummy variable for Swedish press releases, a Sweden dummy. This 
variable takes the value of one if the press release comes from a Swedish company and the 
value of zero if it comes from a Norwegian company.  
To test hypothesis 3 about differences in CAR related to the strength of the environmental 
announcement, we introduce dummy variables for medium and strong announcements. These 
two variables will take the value of one if they are classified as medium or strong, 
respectively, and zero otherwise. The base case for the regression will therefore be a weak 
announcement, and any effects of this will be caught in the constant term. We hypothesize 
that the effect of medium and strong announcements will augment the explained variation of 
the model, as both these categories mean a larger commitment to the environment and 
therefore potential losses or gains. If there are differences, we expect these to be larger for 
strong than for medium announcements.  
Several studies have shown that one of the variables that contribute to explain variance in 
abnormal returns is the size the firm (e.g. Collins et al., 1981, Bathke Jr et al., 1989). This so 
called “size effect” was explored by Banz (1981), who found that small companies tend to 
have higher risk-adjusted returns than larger firms. In the environmental context, it is possible 
that smaller firms are less scrutinized by the public and have less stakeholder pressure to be 
environmentally friendly than larger firms; the effect should therefore be larger for bigger 
firms. We use sales (in NOK) in the last quarter ending before the event as a measure of firm 
size, retrieved from Macrobond (2012). In line with Melnyk et al. (2003), we use dummies for 
the quartiles of the sales instead of absolute value. In this manner we will take size into 
account, but we will not assume that there is a linear relationship between the cumulative 
abnormal return and the sales. Since most companies are represented with several press 
releases in the sample, it could have been a problem that some firms were overrepresented in 
the quartiles. This does not seem to be the case, as the first quartile includes 17 companies, 
the second 16 companies, and the third and fourth include 12 companies each. 
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Some studies include a variable for the market value of equity, but we find that there is a 
correlation of 82.4 % between sales and market value of the firms in the sample. Including 
both variables would thus cause a problem of multicollinearity, and we consequently choose 
not to include market value of equity.  
In line with Fama and French (1995), we also include the market-to-book (M/B) ratio as a 
variable. They find that firms with high market-to-book ratio have higher returns than firms 
with low market-to-book ratio. Firms with a high market-to-book ratio are generally priced 
based on their future earnings and growth opportunities, and not based on their assets of 
today. So if the    ̂[      is more negative for these firms, it may mean that investors believe 
stricter environmental policies will limit growth opportunities, and vice versa if the variable is 
positive. While the market value of equity is found for t= -3, the book value of equity is 
retrieved for the quarter preceding the event (Macrobond, 2012). For those companies which 
were not listed on Macrobond, the remaining book values were gathered through NHH 
Børsprosjektet (2012) or annual reports. For press releases that did not have available data on 
any of these sources due to their age, the oldest possible observation for that company is used.  
In order to identify whether the effect of environmental announcements differs from polluting 
industries to less polluting industries, we introduce a dummy that takes the value of one for 
polluting industries, and zero otherwise. This is based on a separate analysis of the industries 
by both authors where the inter-rater agreement rate was 95%, and any disagreements were 
solved by consensus. We hypothesize that press releases from polluting sectors will aggravate 
any overall effects we identify, since these will have more to win and lose by “going green”.  
In line with Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011), we also define a variable that is the natural 
logarithm of the number of press hits on environmentally related topics in Factiva (2012) 
during the 12 months ending in the month prior to the announcement. This variable is 
included because we hypothesize that the response to firms’ environmental announcements 
becomes more favourable as the public interest for climate issues increases. While it would be 
ideal to include the press hits from Sweden for firms listed in Sweden, and press hits from 
Norway for firms listed in Norway, Factiva does not contain enough sources from these two 
countries to be a representative selection from the two countries. Therefore, we use the world 
interest (measured by total world press hits) for the environment as an approximation of the 
interest in the two countries. We find that the correlation between the natural logarithm of the 
number of press hits and a variable for the year of announcement is 96.1 %, which indicates 
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Figure 3.3: Factiva press hits on the following search phrase: “ISO 14001 OR Climate Change 
OR Sustainability OR Environmental initiative OR CO2 reduction OR emission”. 
that the interest for climate-related issues has increased exponentially over the years. Figure 
3.3 confirms this:  
 
 
 
We also include a variable containing a three month average of the price (in NOK) of brent 
crude oil ending one month prior to the announcement, using the global spot (ICE) price of 
brent crude oil retrieved from Macrobond (2012). The rationale behind this is that a higher oil 
price might increase the profitability of environmental policies.  
Using the three different types of announcements (awards, certification and SRI inclusions, 
initiatives), we create a dummy for announcements that deal with awards and a dummy for 
announcements that deal with certifications and SRI inclusions (collectively referred to as 
certifications). This will allow us to identify any differences in cumulative abnormal returns 
according to the type of announcement. Any effects of the announcement being an 
environmental initiative will then be captured by the constant term of the regression.  
Since some firms are represented more than once in our dataset, we also look at whether the 
reaction to environmental announcements from any of these firms is significantly different 
from the reaction to other environmental announcements. We do so by introducing firm 
dummies for firms that are represented with more than three announcements in the dataset. 
When the firm dummies are included in a regression, we first run the regression including all 
firm dummies, and then rerun the regression including only those firm dummies that have a 
significant effect in the first regression. 
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4. Results and Discussion 
In the previous two chapters the hypotheses have been developed and the methodology has 
been laid out. In this chapter we run the tests necessary to test the hypotheses, and find that a 
firm’s positive environmental performance has no statistically significant effect on its stock 
price, and that this effect is the same for both Norway and Sweden. We also find, however, 
that strong press releases have a significantly worse effect on the stock price than weaker ones 
– a result that is confirmed even with a recategorization of the press releases. 
The first two sections will present the results from the univariate and the cross-sectional 
analyses. The third section will then redo the analyses following a new categorization of the 
strength of the press releases, in order to confirm our findings that the effect becomes more 
negative with higher strength. The last section will go beyond reporting what we have found, 
and contains a discussion of the reasons and implications of our results. 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
The univariate analysis is the first group of tests we run to test our three hypotheses. The first 
part discusses and tests hypothesis 1 only – whether there is an overall effect from releasing 
an environmental press release. Subsections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 test the next two hypotheses, 
looking only at the difference between countries and strength.  
4.1.1. Overall Effect 
Table 4.1 summarizes the results from the three tests Patell-Z, generalized rank test (GRANK-
T), and the generalized sign test (Cowan-Z). In order to test hypothesis 1 of no overall effect, 
we examine the results in the first column. The other columns are not directly used to test any 
of our hypotheses, but give important insight into the various subgroups which can be used in 
the discussions of hypotheses two and three.  
As some of our subsamples are proven to be non-normal (see section 3.4.), we cannot rely 
solely on the parametric Patell-Z test, but must also check the two non-parametric tests. At a 
first glance, the table does not provide much support for rejection of the first hypothesis. The 
Patell-Z test finds the CAAR to not be significantly different from zero even at the 10% level. 
The two non-parametric tests show significance at the 10% level, but only in the event 
window [0,1]. 
 
 
49 
 
  Total Sample Norway Sweden Strong Medium Weak 
Event window [0,1]             
n 125 41 84 13 46 66 
CAAR (%) -0.234 -0.042 -0.328 -0.828 -0.654 0.175 
Patell-Z -1.449 -0.430 0.510 -1.274 -1.840* 0.107 
GRANK-T 1.895* 0.971 1.672* 1.129 2.383** 0.265 
Negative/Positive 75/50 26/15 49/35 9/4 30/16 36/30 
COWAN-Z 1.941* 1.441 1.361 1.351 1.878* 0.503 
  
      Event window [-1,1]             
n 115 39 76 13 43 59 
CAAR (%) -0.253 -0.181 -0.290 -1.544 -0.878 0.487 
Patell-Z -1.105 -0.232 -1.193 -1.966** -1.585 0.733 
GRANK-T 0.106 0.446 1.143 1.533 2.263** -0.801 
Negative/Positive 61/54 21/18 40/36 8/5 27/16 26/33 
COWAN-Z 0.363 0.222 0.288 0.796 1.511 -1.157 
              
Event window [-2,2]             
n 86 31 55 12 28 46 
CAAR (%) -0.101 0.057 -0.191 -1.996 -0.319 0.525 
Patell-Z -0.713 -0.292 -0.673 -1.789* -0.947 0.677 
GRANK-T 0.270 0.311 0.954 2.648*** 1.579 -0.926 
Negative/Positive 46/40 16/15 30/25 10/2 18/10 18/28 
COWAN-Z 0.382 -0.082 0.539 2.278** 1.362 -1.704 
* p-value < 0.10;  ** p-value < 0.05;  *** p-value < 0.01       
All tests are two-sided.           
 
Although we find no significance on the overall level in the two longer event windows, all 
event windows show both a negative CAAR and a preponderance of negative reactions to the 
press releases. This indicates that the effect is in general negative, but not significantly 
enough for us to conclude that it must be so for all other samples than our own.  
Looking at the press releases from companies listed in Norway and Sweden individually, we 
find no notable significance in either a positive or negative direction. However, we can 
observe that CAAR in Norway is always larger than in Sweden, and for the longest event 
window, [-2,2], is even positive.  
When it comes to the medium and strong announcements, the results are somewhat clearer 
than for the whole sample. CAAR is negative in all event windows for both these categories, 
and more so for the strong than the medium announcements. For the strong announcements, 
none of the tests show significant effects for the [0,1] window. For the [-1,1] window, only 
Table 4.1: Results of univariate tests with a null-hypothesis of zero effect. 
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the Patell-Z test shows a significantly negative effect, while for the [-2,2] event window, all 
three tests indicate that the reaction is significantly negative. The CAAR for strong 
announcements in this event window is –1.996 %, indicating that the average strong 
environmental announcement is met with a reduction in firm value (above what is normal for 
the company) of 1.996 % during this period. This equals an average reduction in market value 
of equity of 1 182 million NOK for the companies measured. It is, however, important to 
point out that we have only 12 observations in this category, and any inferences must be 
interpreted accordingly. For the medium announcements, both the Patell-Z test and the two 
non-parametric tests indicate a significant negative effect in the shortest event window, [0,1], 
with a CAAR of -0.65 %. The GRANK-T test also proves significance for a negative effect in 
the [-1,1] window. None of the tests indicate a significant effect of medium announcements in 
the longest event window, quite contrary to what one would expect, given the strong 
category’s very high significance here. In contrast to the medium and strong announcements, 
the reaction to weak announcements is actually positive for all the event windows, but never 
significant.  
The primary aim of the tests performed and discussed in this first subsection is to evaluate 
whether the CAAR in the event window of the overall sample differs from zero. Performing 
the tests on groups of the total sample has also given us some insights when we move on to 
testing hypotheses 2 and 3. In these hypotheses we are interested in comparing the CAAR of 
two or several groups of observations; we want to test whether there are any differences 
related to the country in which the firm is listed or related to the strength of the 
announcement. The interest is whether there are differences in the CAAR between the groups, 
and not directly if the CAAR of a group differs from zero. 
4.1.2. Norway vs. Sweden 
Table 4.2 shows a comparison of the CAAR in Norway and Sweden. The comparison of the 
CAAR in the two countries is done with the parametric t-test assuming unequal variances, as 
well as the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test. There is no significant difference between 
Norway and Sweden, neither for the two-sided t-test nor the Wilcoxon rank sum test. In all 
event windows, however, the reaction to the announcements from the Swedish firms seems to 
be more negative than the reaction to announcements from the Norwegian firms. Appendix 
B.4 shows dot plots for the two countries and the three event windows.  
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4.1.3. Strength 
Appendix B.5 shows a dot plot of the distribution of CAR for the different strengths and event 
windows. Even though all the dotplots show a downward sloping distribution as the press 
release gets stronger, it is the variance in these distributions which critically decides whether 
we can find a significant difference in the means. Table 4.3 shows the results of the Scheffe 
multiple comparison test, the analysis of variance (ANOVA), Bartlett’s test for equal 
variances and the Kruskal-Wallis test. As mentioned in chapter 3 (described in detail in 
Appendix C.3 and C.4), ANOVA tests whether there are any differences between the means; 
Scheffe tests which means are different; Bartlett’s tests if the parametric assumption of equal 
variances in Scheffe and ANOVA holds, and Kruskal-Wallis offers a non-parametric version 
of ANOVA.  
For the event window [0,1], the ANOVA test cannot conclude that the population means of 
the samples weak, medium and strong are not identical. Consequently, Scheffe can find no 
significant differences either. Though the Bartlett’s test shows that the variances may be the 
same for all the categories, chapter 3 gives us reason to believe that the data is non-normally 
distributed. This means that we must put more faith in the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test, 
which actually indicates that the CAAR for at least one of the strength categories is different 
from the CAAR in the other categories on the 5% level – however, it does not let us identify 
which ones are different.  
For the [-1,1] window, Scheffe’s test finds that both the medium and strong announcements  
are significantly different from the weak announcements, but it finds no difference between 
the two former categories. Both the ANOVA and the Kruskal-Wallis test confirm with high 
significance that at least one mean is different from the others.  
 
 
  CAAR (%) T-test 
Wilcoxon rank 
sum 
Event window Norway Sweden T-statistic Z-statistic 
[0,1] -0.042 -0.328 1.146 0.197 
[-1,1] -0.181 -0.290 0.190 0.136 
[-2,2] 0.057 -0.191 0.259 -0.058 
* p-value < 0.10;   ** p-value < 0.05;   *** p-value < .01   
All tests are two-sided.  
Table 4.2: Comparison of the CAAR in Norway and Sweden. 
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CAAR 
(%) 
Std. Dev. 
(%) 
P-values of difference 
(Scheffe) 
ANOVA 
Bartletts 
test 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
test 
        Weak Medium 
F-
statistic chi^2 chi^2 
Event window [0,1]        
  Weak 0.175 2.429 0   
 
    
  Medium -0.654 2.091 0.178 0 2.23 1.21 6.43** 
  Strong -0.828 2.421 0.362 0.972 
 
    
Event window [-1,1]       
 
 
    
  Weak 0.487 2.806 0       
  Medium -0.878 2.720 0.053 0 4.60** 0.05 7.54** 
  Strong -1.544 2.794 0.062 0.750 
 
    
Event window [-2,2]       
 
 
    
  Weak 0.525 3.974 0   
 
    
  Medium -0.319 2.951 0.602 0 2.57* 5.53* 6.43** 
  Strong -1.996 2.360 0.089 0.382       
* p-value < 0.10;   ** p-value < 0.05;   *** p-value < 0.01         
All tests are two-sided.             
 
In the last event window, [-2,2], we can only find a difference between the weak and strong 
categories, while we are unable to conclude that medium announcements are different from 
the two other categories. Both the ANOVA and the Kruskal-Wallis test confirm that at least 
one strength category has a CAAR different from the others; we can therefore assume the 
inference is correct even though the Bartlett’s test shows that the categories have different 
variances.  
Summing up the univariate analysis, we cannot reject hypotheses one and two of no overall 
effect and of equal effects for Norwegian and Swedish companies. We have, however, 
discovered a significant difference pertaining to the strength of the press release. The question 
we will seek to answer in the next section is whether the cross-sectional analysis will 
corroborate these findings.  
4.2. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
The results from the univariate analysis suggest that there is no overall relationship between 
the environmental and economic performance of a firm. However, the results indicate that 
there is a difference related to the strength of the announcement. Moreover, there might also 
be other factors that can help explain the variance in CAR over the observations in the 
Table 4.3: Comparison of the CAAR for weak, medium, and strong. 
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sample. In order to detect these differences, we will perform a cross-sectional analysis in this 
section.  
As described in subsection 3.4.3., we approach the cross-sectional analysis using a WLS 
regression, with the inverse of the standard deviation of the residual from the market model as 
weights. We choose to use the medium long event window, [-1,1], in the regression, and 
therefore the dependent variable is     ̂[     . Excluding those press releases with 
confounding effects in the event window, we have 115 observations.  
In order to ascertain that there is no problem with multicollinearity between the variables in 
our regressions, we analyse the correlation matrix (Appendix E) with relevant variables. A 
commonly used rule of thumb is that two explanatory variables with higher correlation than 
80 % or 90 % should not be included in the same regression because of potential collinearity 
problems (Griffiths et al., 1993). Therefore, we do not include variables with higher 
correlation than 80 % in the same regression.  
Table 4.4 shows the estimated results from six different WLS regressions. Regression 1 
includes all defined variables except the interaction terms and the firm dummies. As the table 
shows, the award dummy and the crude oil price are the only significant variables at the 1 % 
level. Both coefficients are negative. At the 5 % level, also the strong dummy and the 
certification dummy are significant. Both these variables have negative signs in the 
regression. The coefficients of the medium dummy, sales 2
nd
 quartile, and the sales 4
th
 
quartile are negative, while the coefficients of the Sweden dummy, market-to-book, the 
polluting industry dummy, and sales 3
rd
 quartile are positive. None of these variables are 
significant in the model. The adjusted-   of the model is 10.74 %.  
Regressions 2, 3 and 4 all include the crude oil price and the variable for climate press hits 
(LN 12mth press hits). While regression 2 includes the strength dummies (medium and 
strong) and regression 3 includes the type dummies (award and certification), regression 4 
includes all the variables from regression 2 and 3. The crude oil price is significantly negative 
in all three models, although on different levels: on the 5 % level in regression 2 and on the  
1 % level in regressions 3 and 4. The strong dummy is significant on the 10 % level in 
regression 2 and on the 5 % level in regression 4. The coefficient is negative in both 
regressions. The medium dummy is negative, but not significant in any of the models. Both 
the award dummy and the certification dummy are significantly negative on the 5 % level in 
regressions 3 and 4. The coefficient of LN 12mth press hits is positive, but insignificant, in all 
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three regressions. The adjusted-   of these models ranges from 4.67 % to 9.82 %, where the 
highest belongs to regression 4.  
    Weighted Least Squares Regression 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Medium dummy -0.0049 -0.0050   -0.0055 -0.0058 -0.0044 
  t-value -1.08 -1.09   -1.22 -1.27 -0.99 
Strong dummy -0.0181 -0.0132   -0.0145 -0.0134 -0.0191 
  t-value -2.47** -1.91*   -2.13** -1.89* -2.73*** 
Award dummy -0.0141   -0.0107 -0.0119 -0.0122 -0.0133 
  t-value -2.85***   -2.23** -2.52** -2.45** -2.81*** 
Certification dummy -0.0159   -0.0135 -0.0130 -0.0129 -0.0151 
  t-value -2.34**   -2.15** -2.09** -2.05** -2.27** 
LN of 12mth press hits 0.0032 0.0039 0.0027 0.0036 0.0038 0.0033 
  t-value 1.04 1.31 0.89 1.21 1.23 1.11 
Crude oil price (NOK) -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 
  t-value -3.05*** -2.36** -2.85*** -2.82*** -2.52** -3.39*** 
Market-to-Book 0.0012       0.0008   
  t-value 0.76       0.49   
Sweden dummy 0.0024       -0.0001   
  t-value 0.44       -0.02   
Polluting industry dummy 0.0045       0.0042   
  t-value 0.70       0.68   
Sales 2nd quartile -0.0084         -0.0067 
  t-value -1.25         -1.06 
Sales 3rd quartile 0.0022         0.0041 
  t-value 0.3         0.61 
Sales 4th quartile -0.0122         -0.0099 
  t-value -1.59         -1.41 
Constant -0.0121 -0.0340 -0.0114 -0.0194 -0.0270 -0.0071 
  t-value -0.31 -0.97 -0.32 -0.54 -0.71 -0.19 
F-statistic of the model 2.14** 2.40** 3.29*** 3.07*** 2.06** 2.80** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1074 0.0467 0.0745 0.0982 0.0771 0.1245 
Number of press releases 115 115 115 115 115 115 
* p-value < 0.10;   ** p-value < 0.05;   *** p-value < 0.01       
 
In addition to the variables in regression 4, regression 5 includes the market-to-book ratio, the 
Sweden dummy and the polluting industry dummy. The coefficients of market-to-book and 
the polluting industry dummy are positive, while the coefficient of the Sweden dummy is 
negative. None of these three variables are significant, and they only contribute to reduce the 
adjusted-  , which is 7.71 %.  
Table 4.4: Results of regressions 1-6. Coefficients in absolute terms. 
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The last regression model in table 4.4, regression 6, also includes the six variables from 
regression 4 as well as the dummies for the second, third and fourth quartiles of sales. The 
model explains 12.45 % of the variation in CAR. While the coefficients of sales 2
nd
 quartile 
and sales 4
th
 quartile are negative, the coefficient of sales 3
rd
 quartile is positive. None of the 
sales quartile dummies are significant in themselves, but jointly they are almost significant at 
the 10 % level (p-value of 10.72 %). The strong dummy, the award dummy and the crude oil 
price are all significant at the 1 % level, while the certification dummy is significant at the  
5 % level. All these variables have negative coefficients in the model. The medium dummy 
has a negative coefficient and the climate press hits variable has a positive coefficient in the 
model. Neither of them are significant.  
Table 4.5 presents four new regressions where interaction terms and firm specific effects are 
also taken into account. In addition to the variables in regression 6, regressions 7-10 include 
different combinations of the following interaction terms: medium*award, 
medium*certification, Sweden*crude oil price and Sweden*LN 12mth press hits. The 
interaction terms medium*award and medium*certification indicate that the observation is a 
medium award and a medium certification, respectively. The coefficients of Sweden*crude oil 
price measures the partial effect on CAR of the crude oil price for Swedish firms, while the 
coefficient of Sweden*LN 12mth press hits measures the partial effect of the focus on the 
environment for Swedish firms.  
The regressions in table 4.5 also take into account significant firm-specific effects. Firstly, the 
regressions were run with all firm dummies (firms with more than three announcements in the 
dataset). They were then rerun including only those firm dummies that were significant in the 
original regression, and these are the regressions displayed in table 4.5. The firm dummies are 
left out of the table and replaced by the line “Firm Specific Effect”, which indicates whether 
there is a firm-specific effect in the regression or not (“Yes”/”No”). 
The strong dummy, award dummy, crude oil price, sales 2
nd
 quartile, sales 3
rd
 quartile and 
sales 4
th
 quartile and the LN 12mth press hits all have the same sign and significance (or 
insignificance) in regression 7-10 as they have in regression 6. There are, however, some 
differences between the regressions when it comes to the significance of the medium and 
certification dummies. While not significant in any of the regressions in table 4.4, the medium 
dummy is now significantly negative on the 10 % level in regressions 8 and 10. The 
certification dummy is significantly negative on the 10 % level in regressions 7 and 9, and on 
the 5 % level in regressions 8 and 10.  
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    Weighted Least Squares Regression 
Independent variables (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Medium dummy -0.0082 -0.0096 -0.0030 -0.0094 
  t-value -1.25 -1.72* -0.63 -1.69* 
Strong dummy -0.0243 -0.0243 -0.0243 -0.0236 
  t-value -3.36*** -3.37*** -3.34*** -3.31*** 
Award dummy -0.0186 -0.0191 -0.0140 -0.0181 
  t-value -2.97*** -3.13*** -2.89*** -3.06*** 
Certification dummy -0.0138 -0.0154 -0.0134 -0.0149 
  t-value -1.81* -2.32** -1.75* -2.26** 
LN of 12mth press hits 0.0044 0.0044 0.0030 0.0044 
  t-value 1.44 1.43 0.99 1.43 
Crude oil price (NOK) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  t-value -3.57*** -3.56*** -3.7*** -3.62*** 
Sales 2nd quartile -0.0038 -0.0035 -0.0046 -0.0024 
  t-value -0.57 -0.53 -0.68 -0.38 
Sales 3rd quartile 0.0074 0.0076 0.0075 0.0085 
  t-value 1.02 1.05 1.03 1.20 
Sales 4th quartile -0.0061 -0.0057 -0.0085 -0.0046 
  t-value -0.81 -0.77 -1.14 -0.63 
Medium * Award 0.0121 0.0135 
 
0.0133 
  t-value 1.20 1.43 
 
1.41 
Medium * Certification -0.0048 
 
-0.0094 
   t-value -0.43 
 
-0.88 
 Sweden * Crude oil price 0.0000 0.0000 
    t-value 0.73 0.71 
  Sweden * LN of 12mth 
press hits 
  
0.0004 
   t-value 
  
0.85 
 Constant -0.0199 -0.0191 -0.0068 -0.0204 
  t-value -0.52 -0.51 -0.18 -0.54 
Firm-Specific Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic of the model 2.53** 2.75** 2.64** 2.97*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1487 0.1556 0.1469 0.1597 
Number of press releases 115 115 115 115 
* p-value < 0.10;   ** p-value < 0.05;   *** p-value < 0.01 
 
None of the interaction terms are significant, but they have coefficients of the same sign 
across all the regressions they are included in. While those of medium*award and 
Sweden*crude oil price are positive, the coefficients of medium*certification and 
Sweden*LN press hits are negative for all the regressions. The coefficient of determination, 
the adjusted-  , varies from 14.69 % for regression 9 to 15.97 % for regression 10.  
Table 4.5: Results of regressions 7-10. Coefficients in absolute terms.  
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As table 4.5 shows, firm-specific effects were found in all four regressions. In all cases, the 
firm-specific effect could be related to the Norwegian firm Atea, as this was the only 
significant firm-specific effect. The Atea dummy is not reported in table 4.5, but it is taken 
into account in all four regressions. The average CAR in the [-1,1] event window for 
announcements from Atea is 2.29 %. In the regressions, the Atea dummy therefore appears 
with a positive sign. The coefficient varies between 3.05 % and 3.40 %, and is significant at 
the 5 % level in all four regressions. This indicates that only the environmental 
announcements from Atea were significantly different from the other announcements in the 
dataset.  
We have tested all the models for heteroskedasticity, normality of residuals, multicollinearity 
and omitted variables. We find no problems with heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity or 
omitted variables. However, the normality assumption does not hold for all the regressions; 
for regressions 2, 5, 7-8 and 10-14 the p-value of normality ranges from 3.3 % to 8.8 % (see 
Appendix F for details). We therefore need to be careful in the interpretation of these 
regressions.  
4.2.1. Norway vs. Sweden 
The Sweden dummy is included in two regressions and has a positive coefficient in one of 
them and a negative in the other. The variable is never significant. This indicates that the 
country in which the company is listed does not impact the CAR – very much in line with the 
findings in the univariate analysis.  
4.2.2. Strength  
In all regression models in tables 4.4 and 4.5 where the strength dummies are included, strong 
announcements are shown to have a significantly negative effect on CAR. Table 4.5 also 
shows that when the partial effect on CAR of a medium award is taken into account, also the 
medium dummy becomes significantly negative at the 10 % level. Although only significant 
in two of the ten models, the coefficient for the medium dummy is negative in all regressions. 
The strength dummies thus have negative coefficients in all regression models where 
included. While the coefficient of the medium dummy ranges from - 0.44 % to - 0.96 %, the 
coefficient of the strong dummy ranges from - 1.32 % to – 2.43 % in the regression models. 
This strengthens the hypothesis that there is actually a difference in investors’ reaction to an 
environmental announcement according to its strength. Moreover, the tendency seems to be 
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that the more powerful and committing the announcement is, the more negative the reaction 
is.  
4.2.3. Other Findings 
In all regressions where they are included, the award and certification dummies also have 
significantly negative coefficients. These dummies were introduced in order to control for 
potential differences related to the type the announcement. The significantly negative 
coefficients therefore indicate that such differences exist.  
The price of brent crude oil is highly significant, but small, in the ten regressions: -0.01 % or 
less in all models. This indicates that an increase in the oil price of NOK 1 corresponds to a 
change in the CAR of -0.01 percentage points; the reaction in CAR to an environmental 
announcement becomes more negative as the oil price increases.  
Both the number of climate press hits and the polluting industry dummy have positive, but 
insignificant, coefficients in all regressions where they are included. Whether the climate 
focus is high or low and whether the firm belongs to a polluting industry does accordingly not 
seem to explain much of the variation in CAR. If anything, however, the reaction is more 
positive if the climate focus is high and the firm belongs to a polluting industry. The market-
to-book ratio also has an insignificantly positive coefficient. 
The sales quartiles have the same sign in all regressions: sales 2
nd
 quartile has a negative 
coefficient, sales 3
rd
 quartile a positive coefficient and sales 4
th
 quartile a negative coefficient. 
They are, however, never significant.  
Many of the results from the cross-sectional analysis are similar to those from the univariate 
analysis. Investors’ reaction, measured in CAR, seems to become more negative when the 
strength of the environmental announcement increases, but does not seem to be affected by 
the country in which the firm is listed. Nonetheless, the cross-sectional analysis also presents 
new information regarding other factors that help explain the variation in CAR. Among these 
are the crude oil price and the type of the announcement (award, certification or initiative). 
Moreover, the cross-sectional analysis indicates that there are some firm specific effects in the 
data related to the Norwegian firm Atea.  
4.3. Robustness Check/Recategorization 
To some extent, the results from the univariate and cross-sectional analyses presented in the 
previous sections are sensitive to our categorization of the press releases. To test the 
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robustness of the analysis, we reclassify all announcements into two categories, forte and 
piano, based on the criteria in table 4.6, and perform the univariate and cross-sectional 
analyses again based on this classification.  
Forte Piano 
Concrete environmental initiative on firm level.  
International awards. 
Concrete environmental initiative on subsidiary 
level. 
Prestigious certification.  
Inclusion in global sustainability index. 
Certification of plant. 
Local awards. 
National awards. 
Inclusion in national sustainability index.  
Re-inclusion in global sustainability index.  
Non-concrete initiative on firm or subsidiary 
level. 
 
4.3.1. Univariate Analysis 
Table 4.7 shows the results of a comparative analysis of the two strengths piano and forte 
using a two sided t-test and a Wilcoxon rank sum test. Forte is significantly different (more 
negative) from piano on the 1 % level in the [-1,1] window, and on the 10 % level for the  
[-2,2] window. For the shortest event window no such effect can be found.  
  CAAR (%) T-test 
Wilcoxon rank 
sum 
Event window Piano Forte T-statistic Z-statistic 
[0,1] -0.088 -0.545 -0.042 0.586 
[-1,1] 0.172 -1.149 2.407** 2.628*** 
[-2,2] 0.237 -0.842 1.464 1.670* 
* p-value < 0.10;   ** p-value < 0.05;   *** p-value < .01   
All tests are two-sided.  
 
4.3.2. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Table 4.8 shows regressions 1, 6, 9, and 10 run with the forte dummy instead of the medium 
and strong dummies. As regressions 9 and 10, regressions 13 and 14 were first run including 
the firm dummies, but as none of these had a significant effect in the models, they were 
removed. Thus all four regressions in table 4.8 are models that are run without firm dummies.  
 
 
Table 4.7: Comparison of the CAAR for piano and forte. 
Table 4.6: Recategorization of strength categories. 
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    Weighted Least Squares Regression 
Independent variables (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Forte dummy -0.0117 -0.0122 -0.0128 -0.0129 
  t-value -2.50** -2.69*** -2.56** -2.81*** 
Award dummy -0.0129 -0.0124 -0.0124 -0.0158 
  t-value -2.64*** -2.66*** -2.54** -2.88*** 
Certification dummy -0.0130 -0.0124 -0.0132 -0.0118 
  t-value -1.88* -1.84* -1.73* -1.75* 
LN of 12mth press hits 0.0031 0.0031 0.0032 0.0038 
  t-value 1.03 1.05 1.02 1.25 
Crude oil price (NOK) -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
  t-value -2.88*** -3.06*** -3.01*** -3.06*** 
Market-to-Book 0.0015 
     t-value 0.95 
   Sweden dummy -0.0000 
     t-value 0.00 
   Polluting industry dummy 0.0046 
     t-value 0.74 
   Sales 2nd quartile -0.0079 -0.0069 -0.0066 -0.0069 
  t-value -1.17 -1.11 -1.00 -1.11 
Sales 3rd quartile 0.0014 0.0022 0.0026 0.002 
  t-value 0.20 0.33 0.37 0.30 
Sales 4th quartile -0.0083 -0.0068 -0.0064 -0.006 
  t-value -1.07 -0.96 -0.85 -0.85 
Medium * Award 
   
0.0087 
  t-value 
   
1.16 
Medium * Certification 
  
0.0027 
   t-value 
  
0.26 
 Sweden * LN of 12mth 
press hits 
  
-0.0001 
   t-value 
  
-0.12 
 Constant -0.0142 -0.0083 -0.0082 -0.0164 
  t-value -0.37 -0.22 -0.22 -0.43 
Firm-Specific Effect - - No No 
F-statistic of the model 2.34** 3.13*** 2.47** 2.95*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1144 0.1303 0.1142 0.1332 
Number of press releases 115 115 115 115 
* p-value < 0.10;   ** p-value < 0.05;   *** p-value < 0.01     
 
The forte dummy is significantly negative on the 1 % or 5 % level in all four regression 
models. The coefficient varies between -1.17 % and -1.29 %. It follows naturally that the 
coefficient of the forte dummy lies between the coefficient of the medium dummy and the 
strong dummy; some of the announcements originally classified as medium are here classified 
Table 4.8: Results of regressions 10-14. Coefficients in absolute terms. 
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as piano and some as forte. In the same way as the medium and strong dummies, the forte 
dummy also aims to capture a strength effect in the regressions. Also, the award dummy is 
significant on the 1 % or 5 % level in all the regressions in table 4.8. Moreover, the 
certification dummy is significant on the 10 % level in the four models. The coefficients of 
both the type dummies are negative in all models. These results are in line with what we find 
when medium and strong are used as strength dummies. 
The price of brent crude oil is negatively significant on the 1 % level in all four regression 
models. The variables LN 12mth press hits, market-to-book and polluting industry dummy all 
have positive and insignificant coefficients in all models they are included. None of the sales 
quartile dummies are significant in the regressions, but they have the same signs as in the 
models with medium and strong as strength dummies; sales 2
nd
 quartile is negative, sales 3
rd
 
quartile positive and sales 4
th
 quartile negative.  
Both the interaction term for the medium award and for the medium certification have 
positive coefficients in the regressions where they are included. The interaction term 
Sweden*LN 12mth press hits has a negative coefficient in the regression in which it is 
included. None of these interaction terms are significant. Although the signs of the medium 
certification and Sweden*LN 12mth press hits in regressions 11-14 are opposite of those in 
regressions 1-10, the difference is not notable – none of these two variables are significant in 
any of the regressions. 
The adjusted-   of the regression models in table 4.8 ranges from 11.42 % to 13.32 %, which 
is approximately the same as the average of the regressions 1-10. None of the variables seem 
to have a notably different effect in the regressions where forte is used as strength variable 
instead of medium and strong, and the results are thus mostly consistent with the findings of 
the first classification. We therefore continue to base our analysis on the categorization weak, 
medium and strong.  
4.4. Discussion 
Having presented the results of the univariate and cross sectional analyses, this next section 
will concisely answer the research questions presented, and go beyond merely reporting the 
numbers – we will answer why, and not just what.  
4.4.1. Overall Analysis 
As the cross-sectional analysis looks mainly at the differential effects between the press 
releases, it is the univariate analysis that is mainly used to test hypothesis 1. In this analysis 
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we found a preponderance of negative cumulative average abnormal returns for all the event 
windows. This result goes against the findings of Ambec and Lanoie (2008), who indicate a 
clear overweight of studies showing a positive economic impact following a positive 
environmental behavior. The negative effect following the disclosure of a voluntary, 
environmentally positive announcement is more in line with the findings of Fisher-Vanden 
and Thorburn (2011). Our findings are, however, not statistically significant, except for at the 
10% level in the shortest event window, and it is the view of the authors that we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis 1 of no overall effect. We see three possible explanations for no overall 
effect of the announcements.  
The first, and most obvious, explanation is that there is no economic gain or loss from 
investing in environmentally friendly policies. Two different views may explain this 
phenomenon. The first view assumes that all markets are efficient, there are no super profits, 
and no projects that give a higher rate of return than the risk adjusted hurdle rate. All 
managers, presumed to be maximizing shareholder value, will then initiate those 
environmental policies which meet this profit criterion, and reject those that do not. This will 
neither create nor destroy value for the shareholders, and the investors will not care about the 
environmental announcements of a firm. The second view is that markets are not perfect, and 
managers have imperfect information on the expected return of the projects, or act in a 
manner that does not always generate shareholder value. Some projects will then make 
money, and others will lose money. The investors have their own consensus view of the 
profitability of the projects, and no overall significant effect on the share price means that an 
equal amount of projects are profitable and not profitable. This means that environmental 
projects are no different from other projects, and investors do not believe managers start 
unprofitable environmental initiatives for personal reasons. If managers, on the other hand, 
had initiated beyond-compliance and unprofitable policies, we would have found an overall 
observable negative effect. The conclusion under this first explanation is that going green is 
not unprofitable as long as the project is assessed with the same profitability criteria as every 
other project. Or, from another point of view, projects that are friendly towards the 
environment are not frowned upon by investors just for that reason.  
The second explanation for why we find no overall effect is that investors may not be able 
themselves to identify the profitability of the projects. If investors are not able to identify 
whether the environmental policies are Type 1 or Type 2 policies, i.e. whether the 
implementation of the policy will meet the profit criterion or not, they cannot reach a 
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consensus view that will be reflected in a movement in the stock price. For example, if a firm 
reduces its greenhouse gas emissions by increasing the efficiency of its production line, it is 
likely that the implementation will be costly, but the changes might also lead to reduced 
electricity bills and emission permit costs. If the firm does not communicate the costs and 
savings of the project directly, investors in a semi-efficient market might not be able to 
identify whether the project meets the profit criterion or not. The result is that investors see 
some projects as profitable, and others as unprofitable, and we find no overall significant 
reaction to the environmental announcements. This conclusion would be the same regardless 
of whether the managers believe the project to be profitable or not, as the only part we can 
measure are the investors.  
The third possible explanation is that there are indeed effects, but that this study cannot 
identify them using an aggregate analysis. We have included many types of environmental 
actions, policies, awards, and certifications for very different firms, and the effects on the 
stock price following these will vary. It may be that investors are able to see which 
announcements meet the profit criterion or not, but that we cannot identify them in the overall 
analysis. To find any such effects, we have to look at subgroups of our sample; here in 
categories of country and strength.  
4.4.2. Norway vs. Sweden 
When looking at Norwegian and Swedish companies by themselves in subsection 4.1.1, we 
cannot find any significant difference from zero cumulative average abnormal return. Also 
when comparing the countries directly, we cannot identify any differences between the 
samples. This result is also confirmed by the cross-sectional analysis, where the dummy 
variable Sweden is not found to have any effect on CAR in any of the regressions.  
This means that even though inhabitants in Norway and Sweden show different priorities 
when it comes to the environment versus the economy (WVS, 2005-2008), we cannot identify 
different effects from environmentally beneficial press releases in the two countries. In 
formulating the hypothesis of difference, we assumed it was the inhabitants of the two 
countries which bought and traded the shares based on environmental performance. It is, 
however, probable that it is largely the same pool of global and diversified investors that trade 
stocks on both Oslo Stock Exchange and Sweden Stock Exchange, and therefore show the 
same attitudes toward the environment in both countries. Dividing the sample into the country 
of origin does not help explain why there is no significant effect in the overall sample, and we 
therefore keep hypothesis 2.  
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4.4.3. Strength 
As the results have shown, dividing our sample based on the strength of the announcement 
might be a more suitable explanation for the differences in CAR over the press releases. Both 
sets of tests in the univariate analysis, against zero effect and multiple comparisons, find 
significance for various comparisons, strengths and event windows. This indicates that 
strength does indeed have a large impact on the reaction to the announcement. The first 
univariate tests in subsection 4.1.1. show that both strong and medium announcements vary 
significantly from zero, and in a negative direction. However, the effect of medium 
announcements seems to be strongest in the shortest event window, while the effect of the 
strong announcements is greater for the longest event window. These results might indicate 
that the market takes more time to react to stronger environmental commitments than it does 
to less committing announcements. A possible explanation is that there are more leakage 
effects for larger and more important announcements, and that these are captured by the 
longer event window. However, since we have no other indications of leakage effects this 
explanation seems somewhat implausible. The effect could also be totally random, and a 
consequence of the small sample we have in the strong category.  
When comparing the three categories directly in 4.1.3., we find a significant difference when 
looking at the two longest event windows. Here the effect becomes more negative for the 
announcements with a higher strength, a result confirmed in the cross-sectional analysis. 
Though the variable medium is negative compared to the baseline of weak in all the 
regressions, it is only significant when we control for medium awards. The variable strong on 
the other hand, is always highly significant and has a more negative coefficient than medium, 
indicating that the effect becomes more negative as the commitment becomes stronger. 
Reclassifying the strengths into piano and forte also shows a significant difference related to 
strength for both the univariate and cross-sectional analyses. 
These findings indicate that investors become more sceptical as the commitment to the 
environment rises, and the potential costs become higher. This implies that investors do not 
mind a little caring about the environment as long as it does not become too much, involves 
too much prestige or is a too large and potentially costly commitment. Using Prakash’s (2000) 
definition, we can argue that the announcements in the weak category are Type 1 policies, i.e. 
policies that meet the profit criteria, while announcements in the medium and strong 
categories are Type 2 policies that do not meet the profit criteria. A valid question is then why 
this is the case - they are all awards, certifications, SRI inclusions and initiatives, so why 
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should there be a difference? A possible explanation for this is that investors believe that 
signaling environmental responsibility may increase the firm’s reputation and revenues equal 
to or above any related costs, while a too large commitment will benefit the environment 
more than the corporate environmental reputation. This would imply that there is not a linear 
relationship between environmental performance and profitability, but a decreasing return on 
investment as the commitment becomes larger. If consumers think of companies as 
environmentally friendly or not, and do not care (or have enough information to know) 
exactly how friendly they are, these results show that a weak commitment will approximately 
break-even as the company then can be perceived as environmentally friendly. If the 
commitment is too strong and costly however, investors do not believe it will pay off, and 
consequently punish the stock. 
A corollary of this discussion is that the only profit opportunity pertaining from 
environmental investments is through improved reputation. This can increase revenues 
through better access to certain markets and differentiating products; while costs may be cut 
by better risk management and relations with external stakeholders, and lower cost of labour 
(Ambec and Lanoie, 2008). However, improved environmental performance will not at all 
increase profits through higher efficiency, which was the first idea first proposed by Porter 
(1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995a, 1995b). An important question not discussed 
here is why some managers initiate these Type 2 policies, even though they destroy 
shareholder value. Prakash (2000) studies this to some extent.  
Though our initial categorization of the press releases into weak, medium and strong is not 
based on any existing theory, the idea behind it was that strong announcements have greater 
impact on firm value than do weak announcements. The fact that we find somewhat high 
significance based on our categorization may indicate that investors do indeed perceive 
differences between the categories in a similar manner to us, meaning that our categorization 
may be used for further research into under which circumstances investors perceive it to be 
profitable to adopt an environmental policy. This also applies for the recategorization into 
piano and forte, though using only two categories may not allow for much leeway in the 
classification process. 
4.4.4. Other Findings 
In addition to testing the three hypotheses, especially the cross-sectional analysis has brought 
up several other results and problems worth discussing. 
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The first issue is the low coefficient of determination, and the possibility that the omitted 
variable firm strategy may somehow explain why the effects of a press release differs from 
company to company. Although we find significant effect of some of the variables in the 
regression models, it is still a problem that none of the models explain much of the variation 
in the CAR; the adjusted-   is at most 15.97 %. This means that 84 % of the variation in 
CAR remains unexplained. Although we have tested for omitted variables bias (see Appendix 
F), and cannot prove any such problem, it seems reasonable that there are other variables that 
can better explain the variation in the cumulative abnormal returns. As suggested by Telle 
(2006), such variables might for example be management quality or employee motivation. In 
our case, management quality might be reflected in the extent to which environmental 
initiatives are in line with the overall strategy of the company, and thus how an initiative is 
perceived by the investors.  
The second notable result (or lack thereof) is the effect from the size of the company 
(measured by sales). We cannot find that this has any significant effects on CAR for any of 
the regressions, and though this does not lead us to conclude that there is no relationship 
between the cumulative abnormal return related to the announcement and the size of the 
company, it means we cannot prove that any such relationship exists. If we do suppose that 
there is no such relationship, it would mean that the expectations about environmental policy 
toward companies of different sizes are similar; investors interpret the action of taking 
environmental responsibility equally for small and large firms. Since larger companies 
generally have more media coverage, this would also imply that media coverage and the 
frequency with which news arrive has no impact on the reaction to the announcement. Though 
it may seem a bit counterintuitive, it is in line with the assumptions about market efficiency 
we have described earlier in the thesis, where all relevant information is spread efficiently to 
investors.  
The third and somewhat surprising result is the negative coefficient for the award dummy 
variable. It does not seem intuitive that receiving an award for outstanding environmental 
performance should lead to a more negative CAR than implementing an initiative to reduce 
the environmental impact of the firm. While the direct costs of an initiative can be substantial, 
the costs directly related to receiving an award can hardly be imagined to be of any 
significance. An explanation may be found in the fact that while the firm is in control of press 
releases concerning initiatives, and releases them for the sake of reputation, the award is an 
external part telling investors that the firm is environmentally friendly. If this is the first time 
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the investors learn about the firm’s environmental profile, or if they fear that the award might 
encourage the CEO to initiate new and unprofitable environmental initiatives, they may 
punish the firm by selling the stock. An alternative explanation for why the average CAR falls 
is that investors do indeed value environmental initiatives, but value less awards that show 
little opportunity to cut costs or increase revenues. A conspicuous element is that the medium 
dummy becomes significantly negative when we control for the more positive medium 
awards. An interpretation of this is that strength does not have the same effect on awards as 
on other categories. The interaction term is however not significant, so we cannot draw too 
firm conclusions from it.  
Also for certifications we observe a significant negative effect compared to initiatives, with 
roughly the same magnitude as the awards. This is in line with other studies (e.g. Cañón-de-
Francia and Garcés-Ayerbe, 2009, Paulraj and de Jong, 2011) which have identified a 
negative effect from announcing environmental certifications. This may be either because (1) 
environmental certifications and management systems like the ISO 14001 are too expensive 
to implement and do not generate real savings, (2) the certifications do not enhance a 
company’s environmental reputation enough to generate additional cash flow, or (3) a 
combination of the two. 
The price of oil has a highly significant impact on how environmental announcements are 
perceived by the investors. However, the effect is in the opposite direction of what we would 
expect; an increase in the oil price corresponds to a decrease in the profitability of the press 
release. This is counter-intuitive; one would think that environmental initiatives would be 
more profitable if the oil price (and the cost of energy) is higher. 
The variable market-to-book is not significant in any regressions. This indicates that there are 
no differences between what we can consider as growth (high M/B) and mature (low M/B) 
firms when it comes to the perceived costs and benefits of being environmentally friendly. We 
can deduce that investors do not believe that stringent environmental standards will 
specifically limit growth opportunities (although they can still influence profitability), a 
finding that is not consistent with Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) who discover that the 
CAR is lower for high-growth firms.  
We cannot find any consistent relationship between climate press hits (strongly correlated 
with year) and the cumulative abnormal returns. An inference of this is that the effect has 
been consistent over time, and is not directly related to the public emphasis on climate issues. 
There are three possible explanations for why the variable is not significant: (1) Investors do 
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not relate to common societal attitudes and thus do not care about the public interest; (2) 
investors have been taking the climate and its possible risks and gains into account since the 
start of the measured period, or (3) the variable we have identified is not a good proxy for 
environmental interest in Norway and Sweden.  
Looking for firm-specific effects identified the Norwegian firm Atea to have a strong positive 
effect on CAR for the event window [-1,1]. This firm is a Nordic IT infrastructure solutions 
and services company, and there is no obvious reason why it should be different from all the 
others in our sample. Taking Atea into account in the regression increases the explanatory 
power of the model, but does not explain why. The positive coefficient may well be related to 
the unobserved variable firm strategy or management quality, but this is difficult to know 
without a firm-specific analysis.  
To sum up the findings of this chapter, we cannot strongly reject the null hypothesis number 1 
of no overall effect of the press release related to an environmental policy. Though at the 
aggregate level we find weak significance for one event window, there is no such effect for 
the other two. Three possible explanations for this is that (a) there is no economic effect from 
these policies, (b) investors are unable to correctly identify the profitability of the projects, or 
(c) there is an effect, but we are unable to uncover it at an aggregate level.  
Studying proposition (c) more closely we divide the sample into subgroups based on the 
country and the strength of the press release. When examining the differences between 
Norwegian and Swedish companies we cannot identify any effects, and thus we keep the null 
hypothesis number 2. Analyses of the differences in CAAR divided by strength indicate that 
as the announcement becomes stronger, the cumulative abnormal returns for a company 
become more negative. This makes a division on strength a more likely explanation as to why 
we find no overall effect in the sample. It seems that being slightly environmentally friendly 
can help a company as long as it increases its reputation, but that investors believe any 
activity above this will only destroy value. We therefore reject hypothesis 3 and accept the 
alternative hypothesis of different reactions related to the strength of the environmental 
announcement.  
4.5. Implications and Limitations 
Now that we have discussed the findings of our research, it is important to identify the 
implications these might have, and the sort of research that should be considered in the 
following. A notice on the limitations of the thesis is also in place.  
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In order to confirm the findings of our thesis, we suggest more research into the stock price 
reaction related to both the strength and the type of the environmental press release. Our 
recategorization shows that the strength effect is not random, but both categorizations would 
benefit from further research.  
This is also the first paper, to our knowledge, that seeks to answer the elusive question “Does 
is pay to be green?” through more than one proxy of environmental performance. By 
comparing these proxies to find which were more appreciated by investors, we have 
acknowledged that this question may not have one definitive answer, and have instead sought 
to answer “When does it pay to be green?”. Confirming the strength and type effect we have 
found, but with another sample, may help in the development of a model which allows 
managers to optimize their environmental efforts within the goal of maximizing shareholder 
value – satisfying both investors and environmental lobbyists.  
It would also be valuable to understand why some managers still initiate unprofitable 
environmental policies. Though Prakash (2000) looks at this to some extent, it may also be 
prudent to research it from a non-neoclassical view and accept that managers do not only act 
rationally in order to maximize shareholder value.  
There are also some limitations to the work we have done, one of which is our sample 
selection. We have twice as many announcements from companies listed on the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange than on Oslo Stock Exchange, and there is therefore a “Swedish bias” in our 
overall sample. Moreover, as we have several observations from some companies and just one 
observation from others, some companies and their specific characteristics are 
overrepresented in the sample. There is also a “self-selection bias” in the sample; only firms 
that announce their environmental commitments are included in the study while those that are 
revealed through private channels or public channels other than press releases and newspapers 
are excluded. Next, our sample consists of a variety of environmental announcements: 
initiatives, certifications and awards. It is the view of the authors that this is a large strength in 
the comparison analysis, but a weakness when looking for overall effects. Finally, the small 
number of strong press releases is a shortcoming not insignificant to the analysis and results.  
  
70 
 
5. Conclusion 
The question “Does it pay to be green?” has been met with a host of research the last couple 
decades, but findings are mixed, and the answer remains elusive. This thesis has tried to 
contribute to the research by looking at only companies listed in Norway and Sweden, and 
also by taking into account the amount of commitment the companies announce. 
We have researched the connection between environmental and economic performance by 
looking at the stock market reaction to any news announcements related to an environmental 
award, certification, or voluntary initiative. Cumulative abnormal returns have been used to 
measure the above or below normal returns for the stock of a company following such a news 
announcement. Through both a univariate and a cross-sectional analysis, we discover that 
although there is no overall effect - or any difference between Norway and Sweden - of a 
positive environmental announcement, the average cumulative abnormal return decreases as 
the strength of the announcement increases. This indicates that the market does not mind a 
small environmental commitment, but that it is bothered by larger and potentially more 
expensive ones. A possible explanation for this is that small environmental initiatives and 
certifications are seen as a cheap “signal” of a company being green, while stronger initiatives 
indicate expenses beyond what is necessary in order to convince customers of the company’s 
environmental friendliness. An implication of this is that the only profits investors expect 
from “going green” are related to enhanced corporate reputation or diversification 
opportunities, while not at all from increased efficiency or waste managements, as first 
proposed by the Porter Hypothesis (1991). 
The cross-sectional analysis also identified a difference between varying types of press 
releases regarding whether they concern an environmental award, initiative, or certification. 
We find that awards and certifications alike are met with a more negative reaction than 
initiatives. 
If new research can confirm our results with regard to both the strength and the type effect, 
managers may soon be able to maximize their environmental efforts within that framework, 
thus initiating policies that help both the environment and investors. New research would also 
show whether large and impactful commitments to the environment can ever be initiated by 
managers, or if government bodies have to introduce regulations to curb greenhouse gas 
emissions and secure other environmental concerns.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Description of Press Releases 
# Company Cou-
ntry 
Date Strength Description Factiva 
Confounding 
Effects 
1 Aker 
BioMarine 
N 25.05.2010 Medium Awarded for environmental 
excellence 
None 
2 Aker 
BioMarine 
N 16.05.2011 Medium Certification for 
environmental sustainability 
+2 Significant 
supply 
agreement 
3 ASSA 
ABLOY  
S 31.08.2009 Weak Subsidiary receives 
environmental award 
None 
4 Atea N 31.03.2008 Medium Green IT and ISO 14001 is 
and will be implemented in 
all business units/subsidiaries 
None 
5 Atea N 19.06.2008 Strong Whole group will implement 
ISO 14001, goal of being 
CO2 neutral in 2009 
None 
6 Atea N 05.06.2009 Weak Subsidiary ISO 14001 
certified 
None 
7 Atea N 27.08.2009 Medium Whole group ISO 14001 
certified 
None 
8 Atea N 01.06.2011 Strong CO2 emissions reduced by 
14.8% since 2007, Goal to 
reduce by 25% within 2015 
None 
9 Atlas Copco S 15.02.2000 Weak Subsidiary in U.S. ISO 14001 
certified 
-1 ‘99 Earnings 
released, 
dividend 
announcement 
10 Atlas Copco S 17.08.2000 Weak Facilities in Sweden ISO 
14001 certified  
None 
11 Atlas Copco S 12.11.2001 Weak Subsidiary in China ISO 
14001 certified 
None 
12 Atlas Copco S 13.03.2002 Weak Subsidiary in Britain ISO 
14001 certified 
+2 Subsidiary 
announces 
share buyback 
13 Atlas Copco S 24.06.2002 Weak Site in Sweden ISO 14001 
certified 
None 
14 Atlas Copco S 06.07.2005 Weak ISO 14001 certification in 
China  
None 
15 Atlas Copco S 10.02.2006 Weak Site in China ISO 14001 
certified 
None 
16 Atlas Copco S 28.01.2010 Weak Global top 100 (Davos) - fifth 
year in a row 
None 
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17 Axfood S 30.01.2009 Medium Joins climate network 
(BLICCC), Members have 
reduced environmental 
impact by 25 % last 3 y. 
+2 Annual 
report 
18 Axfood S 29.10.2009 Weak Subsidiary into collaboration 
with Naturskyddsföreningen 
-2 New 
product line 
19 Axfood S 15.12.2009 Strong Will reduce its environmental 
impact by 75 % within 2020 
None 
20 Axfood S 09.09.2010 Medium Subsidiary builds two wind 
mills on storage locations 
None 
21 Axfood S 15.06.2011 Weak Subsidiary receives 
environmental award from 
Green Cargo 
-2 New 
purchasing 
manager 
22 Copeinca N 22.03.2011 Weak Subsidiary ISO 14001 
certified 
None 
23 DNB N 21.12.2007 Weak One of 14 founders of 
Klimagevinst 
None 
24 Eidesvik 
Offshore 
N 08.06.2011 Weak Awarded for environmental 
performance 
None 
25 Eidesvik 
Offshore 
N 14.12.2011 Medium Collaboration on cutting 
emissions  
None 
26 Electrolux S 28.04.2009 Strong Will cut energy consumption 
by 15 % within 2012 
compared to 2008 levels. 
None 
27 Eltek N 10.11.2011 Weak Award from city of 
Richardson 
None 
28 H&M S 30.11.2011 Weak Engages with French 
government on 
environmental product 
labelling 
-1 
Collaboration 
w/ designer 
29 H&M S 02.12.2011 Weak H&M brands ranked among 
20 most sustainable brands 
by GoedeWar 
None 
30 Holmen S 24.09.2009 Medium Receives Drottning 
Kristinapriset for its 
environmental work 
+2 Cuts 200 
jobs, trim 
capacity 
31 Holmen S 01.06.2010 Weak Site receives award from the 
Community of Madrid 
None 
32 JM S 25.08.2006 Medium Named one of the world’s top 
20 leading environmental 
companies 
-2 Profit 
release 
33 JM S 02.02.2009 Weak All new offices will be at 
least 25 % below 
requirements on energy 
consumption 
None 
34 JM S 18.05.2009 Medium Whole car fleet has become 
green (as defined by the 
Swedish Tax Agency) 
None 
35 JM S 04.08.2009 Strong Will reduce energy 
consumption with 50 % 
None 
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36 JM S 20.02.2011 Weak Will compensate for its air 
travels by investing in UN’s 
CDM project 
None 
37 Lundin 
Petroleum 
S 11.12.2009 Weak Heads local climate report 
ranking 
None 
38 Marine 
Harvest 
N 23.04.2008 Weak Partnership with WWF 
Norway 
None 
39 NCC S 08.12.2008 Weak Joins Stockholm’s 
Klimatpakt 
-2 1.2 BSEK 
project, 
+2 480MSEK 
profit 
40 NHY N 21.12.2007 Weak One of 14 founders of 
Klimagevinst 
-2 JV with 
Ascent Solar 
41 NHY N 12.01.2010 Strong Aims to be global leader in 
fighting climate change 
within aluminium 
None 
42 NHY N 16.08.2011 Medium Investment in SO2 capture in 
Årdal 
-2 CEO 
purchases 
shares 
43 Nokia S 03.07.2009 Weak Best electronics company in 
the world according to 
Greenpeace 
+2 650MUSD 
bid approved 
44 Nokia S 21.09.2009 Strong Best technology company in 
the world according to Dow 
Jones SRI 
None 
45 Nokia S 30.09.2009 Weak Best electronics company in 
the world according to 
Greenpeace 
None 
46 Norske Skog N 07.04.2003 Medium Included in SRI index in 
Belgium 
None 
47 Norske Skog N 24.08.2005 Weak  Best in Norway in climate 
reporting 
None 
48 Norske Skog N 14.05.2007 Weak Climate initiative in Thai 
schools with WWF 
None 
49 Norske Skog N 28.09.2009 Medium Best in the Nordic region in 
CDP 
-2 Sale of 
800MNOK 
50 Nordic 
Semiconduct
or 
N 31.03.2004 Weak Chose semiconductor 
component that was “green”  
None 
51 Odfjell N 14.05.2009 Weak Planned green certification 
for 18 ships by Lloyds 
None 
52 Odfjell N 04.12.2011 Weak Commits to UN Global 
Compact goals 
None 
53 Orkla N 21.12.2007 Weak One of 14 founders of 
Klimagevinst 
None 
54 PGS N 04.09.2003 Weak Establishes HSE Committee None 
55 PGS N 26.04.2004 Weak Award from Alaska 
Department of Natural 
Resources  
None 
56 Photocure N 02.10.2003 Medium Acknowledged by the 
Kempen/SNS SRI index 
None 
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57 RCL N 08.12.2006 Weak Joins “Scream if You’re 
Going Green” 
-2 Starts 
cruising 
Singapore, +2 
declares 
dividend 
58 RCL N 18.06.2010 Medium Implements new technology 
to reduce climate gasses 
None 
59 REC N 02.09.2011 Medium White paper on sustainability 
and climate commitment 
None 
60 SAAB S 05.02.2008 Strong Joins clean skies program, 
researching to reduce 
emissions by 20-40% 
None 
61 Sandvik S 01.10.2004 Weak Plant ISO 14001 certified -1 Buys a 
German firm 
62 Sandvik S 26.10.2011 Weak Listed on top 250 Newsweek 
green rankings 
None 
63 SAS N 25.09.2008 Weak Joins group for research on 
alternative biofuels 
None 
64 SAS N 23.09.2010 Medium First airline in world to get 
both EMAS and ISO14001 
-2 Agrees to 
sell Estonian 
Airlines 
65 SCA S 27.01.1999 Weak More than two million 
hectares of forest have been 
certified FSC 
+2 Profit 
release 
66 SCA S 03.11.2006 Medium Best Sustainability company 
in Sweden 
None 
67 SCA S 15.05.2007 Strong Reduced CO2 emissions by 
4% last year 
None 
68 SCA S 01.06.2007 Strong Second most environmentally 
friendly in the world, by 
EIRIS 
None 
69 SCA S 07.12.2007 Weak Best sustianability report in 
paper industry, according to 
WWF 
None 
70 SCA S 08.02.2008 Medium One of 100 most sustainable 
companies in the world by 
Innovest (top 5%) 
None 
71 SCA S 09.06.2008 Medium Ranked one of the most 
ethical companies in the 
world (top 2%) by Etisphere 
1. year 
None 
72 SCA S 10.12.2008 Strong SCA sets a new 
environmental goal, reduce 
Co2 by 20% 
None 
73 SCA S 30.01.2009 Weak Ranked top 100 sustainable 
companies in the world by 
CCK 5
th
 year 
-1 Financial 
press release 
74 SCA S 16.03.2009 Weak Ranked one of the most 
ethical companies in the 
world by Etisphere 2. year 
-2  Annual 
report 
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75 SCA S 30.03.2009 Weak Sustainability report 
confirming Co2 reduction 
targets, 20% by 2020 
-1 Restructures 
Italy and 
France 
76 SCA S 07.12.2010 Weak Awarded for best 
sustainability reporting 
None 
77 SCA S 28.11.2011 Medium Will reduce water 
consumption in stressed 
regions 
None 
78 Scania S 10.11.1998 Medium Won EKO price 98 for 
ecology and economy 
None 
79 Scania S 16.04.1999 Medium Entire Sweden operation 
receives ISO 14001 
certification 
-2 Q1 report 
80 Scania S 18.09.2008 Weak Has started environmental 
training program for drivers 
None 
81 SEB S 03.04.2007 Medium Adopts Equator Principles -2 Sells car 
financing 
82 Skanska S 07.09.1999 Weak Two US subsidiaries ISO 
14001 certified 
None 
83 Skanska S 20.12.2000 Medium Achieved ISO 14001 for 
entire Skanska 
None 
84 Skanska S 21.09.2001 Strong Tops list of construction 
companies on the DJ 
sustainability index 
None 
85 Skanska S 15.05.2008 Weak Top ten Sunday Times green 
UK companies 
None 
86 Skanska S 10.02.2009 Weak Introduces LEED 
certification for all buildings 
-2 Annual 
report 
87 Skanska S 27.04.2009 Weak Calls for all construction to 
join in fight against climate 
change 
None 
88 Skanska S 11.11.2010 Medium Receives US green building 
award 
None 
89 Skanska S 12.06.2011 Medium Top of the list, Sunday Times 
green UK companies 
None 
90 SKF S 13.01.1999 Medium Whole group ISO 14001 
certified 
-2 Cuts 
American 
production 
91 SKF S 16.01.2004 Weak Awarded for best 
sustainability report in 
Sweden from SIPA 
None 
92 SKF S 15.02.2007 Medium Will install green technology 
in production process to cut 
CO2 emissions 
None 
93 SKF S 13.11.2009 Medium Joined cooperation with UK 
consultants to create energy 
efficient solutions 
None 
94 SKF S 24.11.2009 Weak Joined cooperation with 
industry competitor to make 
sustainable industry 
None 
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95 SKF S 15.12.2009 Weak Tops the Folksam list for 
environmental issues and 
human rights 
None 
96 Statoil N 17.08.2005 Medium Among best petroleum 
companies on environment in 
the world according to 
International Association of 
Oil & Gas Producers 
None 
97 Stora Enso S 13.10.2000 Weak Sustainable forest certified in 
North America 
-1 Sells a mill 
worth 250 
MSEK 
98 Stora Enso S 11.07.2001 Medium Included in FTSE4Good, 1
st
 
time 
None 
99 Stora Enso S 29.01.2009 Medium One of 100 most sustainable 
companies in the world at the 
WEF in Davos 
None 
100 Stora Enso S 17.03.2011 Weak Ranked one of the most 
ethical companies in the 
world by Etisphere 4. year 
None 
101 Stora Enso S 10.06.2011 Weak EU award for innovative 
recycling 
None 
102 Telenor N 24.04.2008 Medium Launches ambitious CO2 cuts 
in Hungary 
+2 Subsidiary 
reports 
earnings 
103 Telenor N 23.08.2008 Medium Launches very ambitious cuts 
(50%) in Malaysia 
+2 Sues IBM 
for 100 MNOK 
104 Telenor N 26.11.2009 Medium Sets CO2 cut targets for 
Bangladesh 
-1 New CFO, 
+2 increases 
stake in 
Unitech 
105 TeliaSonera S 05.03.2002 Weak Cuts travel budget by 25% by 
promoting virtual meetings 
+2 
Disfavourable 
PTS ruling 
106 TeliaSonera S 02.10.2007 Strong Switched to only green 
power, Reducing Co2 by 
20% 
-2 Subsidiary 
reports 
earnings 
107 TeliaSonera S 25.01.2012 Medium Ranked the 13
th
 most 
sustainable company in the 
world at the WEF in Davos 
None 
108 TGS N 19.01.2004 Medium Written into the 
Kempen/SNS SRI index 
None 
109 Veidekke N 21.12.2007 Weak One of 14 founders of 
Klimagevinst 
-1 Awarded 
292 MNOK 
contract 
110 Volvo S 24.03.1998 Medium Aims to become among 
leading automotive 
companies in terms of 
environmentally compatible 
products and processes 
+2 Announces 
trucks to be 
made in China 
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111 Volvo S 26.06.2000 Weak Launches internet based 
global environmental 
education initiative 
None 
112 Volvo S 08.10.2002 Weak Plant in Sweden cuts energy 
consumption by 90 per cent 
None 
113 Volvo S 15.02.2005 Weak Subsidiary participates in 
program for environmentally 
sound aircraft engines 
-2 Share 
buyback 
114 Volvo S 27.09.2005 Medium Launches world’s first CO2-
free automotive plant 
-1 Truck 
deliveries 
announced 
115 Volvo S 22.02.2006 Medium Subsidiary makes assembly 
plant in Belgium CO2 free 
None 
116 Volvo S 28.06.2007 Weak Joint environmental program 
with US and Swedish 
Governments 
None 
117 Volvo S 20.09.2007 Medium Plant in Ghent first in the 
world with CO2 free vehicle 
production 
+2 Truck 
deliveries 
announced 
118 Volvo S 22.01.2008 Medium Subsidiary helps suppliers 
reduce CO2 emissions by 
20% 
+2 1 BSEK 
loan 
119 Volvo S 16.06.2008 Weak Solar energy makes Volvo 
dealers climate-neutral 
None 
120 Volvo S 10.10.2008 Weak US Environmental Protection 
Agency recognizes subsidiary 
for CO2 reductions 
-2 Fires 4000 
employees 
121 Volvo S 04.11.2010 Medium Partnership with WWF to 
reduce CO2 emissions 
-1 Truck 
deliveries 
announced 
122 Volvo S 25.05.2011 Medium More efficient logistics 
reduced carbon footprint by 
22 per cent, Plant in Vara is 
carbon neutral 
None 
123 Wilh. W N 18.04.2011 Medium Reduced CO2 emissions in 
2009, continues this year 
None 
124 Wilh. W N 21.11.2011 Weak Continue collaboration with 
Bellona 
None 
125 Yara N 21.12.2007 Weak One of 14 founders of 
Klimagevinst 
None 
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Appendix B: Data Description 
B.1. Frequency Plots of all Event Windows for Full Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.2. Frequency Plots of all Event Windows by Country  
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B.3. Frequency Plots of all Event Windows by Strength  
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B.4. Dot Plots of CAR [-1,1] by Country 
 
 
B.5. Dot Plots of CAR [-1,1] by Strength 
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Appendix C: Statistical Tests – Univariate Analysis 
C.1. Tests of Zero Effect 
When we test whether environmental press releases have an effect on the stock price of a 
firm, we test the hypothesis:   
                 
                 
We use three different tests to test such hypotheses; the Patell test (Patell, 1976), the 
Generalized sign test (Cowan, 1992) and the Generalized rank t-test (Kolari and Pynnonen, 
2011). The Patell test is a parametric test based on the assumption of normally distributed 
stock returns, while the non-parametric Generalized sign test and Generalized rank t-test do 
not make any assumptions about the underlying distribution of the abnormal returns. These 
may give better results if the underlying stock prices are not normally distributed. The tests of 
zero effect are especially interesting when testing hypothesis 1. 
C.1.1. Patell Test 
The Patell test was developed by James Patell (1976), and is commonly used in event studies. 
The test is based on the assumption of normally distributed returns. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that abnormal returns are uncorrelated: 
   (  ̂      ̂   )  {
                 
      
         
 
  
  is the variance of the residuals for press release i from the market model during the 
estimation period.       is an adjustment factor that accounts for the increase in variance that 
results from prediction outside of the estimation period (Patell, 1976): 
       
 
 
 
(      ̅ )
 
 
∑ (      ̅ )
   
    
 
where            , the number of days in the estimation period, and the average market 
return is calculated during the estimation period: 
 ̅  
 
 
∑     
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Under these conditions and the OLS assumptions, the standardized abnormal return is student-
t distributed with T-2 degrees of freedom: 
     
  ̂   
  √    
 
Where    is an unbiased estimate of   : 
  
  
∑   ̂  
   
    
     
 
Where T is the number of days in the estimation period and k is the number of explanatory 
variables in the regression, which in this case is 1 (the market return). The numerator is the 
sum of squared residuals from the OLS regression, while the denominator is the degrees of 
freedom.  
The standardized cumulative abnormal return is then: 
            ∑
  ̂   
  √             
  
    
 
where         is the length of the event window. There is one such test statistic for each 
of the press releases in each event window length. The test statistic is Student-t distributed 
with T-2 degrees of freedom (when T is the number of days in the estimation period). Each of 
these test statistics has the following expectation and variance: 
 (           )    
   (           )  
   
   
 
Under the assumption that            is Student-t distributed, the Central Limit Theorem 
implies that the following test statistic is normally distributed:  
            
∑            
 
   
√  (
   
   )
 
which is the standardized sum of            statistics over all press releases. n is the number of 
press releases. The test statistic is specified for each event window length, and is what we will 
refer to as the Patell-Z test. 
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C.1.2. Generalized Sign Test 
Sign tests are often used in event studies. These use the normal approximation to the binomial 
distribution to test whether the fraction of negative to positive CAR’s in the event window 
significantly deviates from 0.5 (Cowan, 1992). The null hypothesis of no effect in the event 
window is thus interpreted as if there should be an equal split between positive and negative 
abnormal returns. The generalized sign test, however, compares the proportion of negative to 
positive cumulative abnormal returns in the event window to the proportion of negative to 
positive abnormal returns in the estimation period, represented by  ̂. Cowan (1992) uses the 
inverse proportion, positive to negative results, to estimate  ̂. The inferences from the test will 
naturally be the same, but the test statistic will in our case be positive for negative abnormal 
returns.  
Using the notation as in chapter 3,  ̂ is calculated by  
 ̂   
 
 
 ∑
 
     
 
   
∑     
  
    
 
where  
      {
         ̂     
            
 
Defining w as the number of stocks for which the CAR in the event window is negative, the 
generalized sign test statistic is 
    
    ̂
√  ̂    ̂ 
 
where ZG is standard normally distributed with a zero mean and unit variance.  
C.1.3. Generalized Rank Test 
A rank test developed by Corrado (1989), has been widely used by researchers since its 
introduction. An underlying problem with the test is that it can only be applied to event 
windows of one day, and all solutions to this problem reduce the power and applicability of 
the test (Kolari and Pynnönen, 2010, Cowan, 1992). Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) have 
developed a new test to account for this problem, the generalized rank test (GRANK). As 
opposed to Corrado (1989), this test also accounts for event induced volatility, cross 
correlation from event-day clustering, and also demonstrates power equal to or greater than 
other both parametric and non-parametric tests. The notation used here is also consistent with 
what has been used in earlier chapters.  
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To take into account different variances in the stocks (i.e. risk), we find the standardized 
abnormal returns (SAR) as in Patell (1976).  
   ̂     
  ̂   
    
 
where      is the estimated standard deviation of the abnormal returns, approximated as in 
MacKinlay (1997) as the standard deviation of the regression prediction errors (RMSE, root 
of mean squared errors from the market model of each press release).    ̂          is calculated 
as in section 3.2. Next, the standardized cumulative abnormal return (    ̂         ) for each 
press release i and event window         is found by:  
    ̂           
   ̂        
            
 
where the standard deviation of    ̂          is again approximated as in MacKinlay (1997) to 
be 
                   √        
that is the standard deviation of the abnormal return times the length of the event window. To 
account for event induced volatility, the standardized cumulative abnormal return is again 
standardized with the cross-sectional standard deviation. The re-standardized     ̂          is 
    ̂ 
   
    ̂         
             
 
where  
              √
 
   
∑     ̂             
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
         
 
 
   
 
and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅       is the arithmetic average of     ̂         for all press releases. 
Using     ̂ 
  as the standardized abnormal returns in the event period, we can compare this to 
the standardized abnormal returns in the estimation period and assign them a rank where 1 is 
the lowest and 252 is the highest (251 estimation days and one period for the event window). 
Formally, Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) define the generalized standardized abnormal returns 
     ̂     as  
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    ̂     {
    ̂ 
             
   ̂                      
. 
The demeaned standardized abnormal ranks of the generalized abnormal returns are then 
defined as 
     
    (    ̂   )
   
     
where            , and    {         } is a set of time indexes where 0 is the event 
window. Under the null hypothesis of no mean effect on the stock price following the press 
release,      should have an expectation equal to zero for all releases. Using this, the authors 
define a single t-ratio that can be used for all event window lengths.  
        √
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 ∑   
  
   
  
where    is the number of valid generalized standard abnormal returns      ̂     available at 
time t, t   . This t-ratio is approximately student-t distributed with T-2 degrees of freedom. 
We will refer to this test statistic as GRANK-T. Though this test by Kolari and Pynnonen is 
rather methodically difficult (it is not included in any software), the fact that it allows for a 
non-parametric rank testing of abnormal returns over several days outweighs any negative 
side effects.  
It also corrects any event-induced volatility, the fact that the volatility in stock returns tends to 
increase in the days surrounding an event due to temporary increased systematic risk (e.g. 
Patell and Wolfson, 1979, Brown et al., 1988) . Without taking into account the event induced 
volatility, test statistics will be artificially high, which will lead to rejection of the null 
hypothesis too often (Brown and Warner, 1985). 
C.2. Comparison of Two Groups 
The tests described until now all test for significant deviations from a cumulative average 
abnormal return (CAAR) of zero in the event windows. In order to compare the cumulative 
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abnormal returns of Norway and Sweden we need to test for significant deviations from equal 
CAARs, and not differences from zero.  
Rewriting hypothesis number 2, we have 
                                
                                 
where              is the CAAR of Norwegian press releases in event window         and 
             the CAAR of Swedish press releases in the same window.  
The two tests used to compare the CAARs of Norwegian and Swedish firms are the two-sided 
t-test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank sum test. 
C.2.1. Two-Sided T-test 
The two-sided t-test is a fairly standard test for studying the difference between the means of 
two populations. In our case we have shown the variances in CAR to be different in Norway 
and Sweden, a fact that determines the degrees of freedom in the t-statistic.  
Using the method of Newbold et al. (2010), the degrees of freedom are calculated by 
Satterwaite’s approximation, defined as 
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where   
  is the sample variance in CAR from the Norwegian press releases,   
  the equivalent 
for the Swedish, and    and    are the respective number of press releases.  
When the variances in the two samples are unequal (refer to chapter 3.4), the test statistic is 
given by: 
  
    ̂       ̂ 
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And we will reject the null hypothesis if  
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where     
 
  is the number for which   (      )    , and α is the significance level to be 
checked.  
C.2.2. Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 
The non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum test compares the medians of the two populations 
and checks if they deviate significantly. Also here we use the method used by Newbold et al. 
(2010).  
We start by pooling all the press releases from both Norway and Sweden together, and sorting 
them in ascending order of    ̂ in the event period. We then assign them ranks where one is 
rank of the lowest    ̂.   denotes the sum of the ranks for the Norwegian press releases. If 
the null hypothesis is true, the Wilcoxon rank sum statistic,  , will have the mean and 
variance 
      
           
 
           
   
             
  
    
 For samples where both           are larger than 10, the distribution of the random variable  
   
      
  
 
is approximately normal, and can be used as a test statistic. For a large number of ties, the 
variance will be different, making the test more difficult to apply correctly (Newbold et al., 
2010). This is not a problem for our dataset, and neither is the minimum requirement to 
number of observations.  
C.3. Tests for Multiple Comparisons 
When we test whether there are any differences in the cumulative abnormal returns related to 
the strength of the environmental announcement with ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis, we test 
the hypothesis:  
                                                          
                                                            
In the Scheffe test of multiple comparisons, however, we test the hypothesis:  
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Where m and l are the strength categories; weak, medium or strong.  
C.3.1. One-way ANOVA and Multiple Comparison 
Analysis of variance tests check whether the means of two or more samples are the same, i.e. 
whether we can prove for a given significance level whether at least one of the means is 
different from the others (Mickey et al., 2004). It assumes that all populations tested are 
normally distributed, that the populations have the same variance, and that all observations are 
independent.  
A normal ANOVA only tells us whether one of the populations (weak, medium or strong) is 
different from the others, it doesn’t tell us which one(s) and by how much. This can be done 
through a Scheffe multiple comparison test, which does a simultaneous pairwise comparison 
of all the samples at once. Though we could have compared one mean with another using an 
ordinary t-test, this would significantly increase the probability of making a Type I error (due 
to the fact that many tests are made) (Mickey et al., 2004). This is the strength of multiple 
comparison tests like Scheffe, which in advance limit the experimentwise error rate to e.g. 
5%. Though the Bonferroni multiple comparison method gives somewhat smaller confidence 
intervals, and is therefore more precise, we choose to use the Scheffe method due to its close 
link to the F-test – if the F-test (ANOVA) is not significant, then the Scheffe will not find any 
significance either. However, in our case the inferences will be the same. Wesolowsky (1976) 
suggests using the Scheffe comparison for exploratory analysis.  
The test calculates the absolute difference between two and two means, and then tests whether 
this is significantly different from a comparison value calculated by  
√                   
 
  
 
 
  
  
Where a is the number of categories (3: weak, medium, strong),           is the 1-a percentile 
of and F distribution with respectively a-1 and N-a degrees of freedom. MSE (mean squared 
error) is from the ANOVA test, and multiplied by the sum of the inverse of the respective 
number of observations in each population (weak/medium/strong).  
If the assumptions of normality and equal variances in the Scheffe and ANOVA tests do not 
hold, one must turn to non-parametric tests. 
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C.3.2. Kruskal-Wallis 
In the same way that ANOVA is an extension of a two sided t-test, Kruskal-Wallis is an 
extension of the Wilcoxon rank sum test (Mickey et al., 2004). This test is weaker if the data 
is actually normally distributed, but will work better if that is not the case. But it still assumes 
that the different populations have identical distributions.  
The test ranks all the observations from smallest to largest and then performs an ANOVA on 
the ranked data, calculating the test statistic as the ratio of the factor sum of squares to the 
mean sum of squares (effectively testing how much the fact that observations come from 
different populations explain the variance). Often though, this test will give the same results 
as an ANOVA test, but should be run if we are uncertain about the normality of the data 
(Mickey et al., 2004).  
C.4. Bartlett’s Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
The Bartlett’s test of homogeneity of variance allows us to test whether a group of samples 
has the same inter-sample variance. Equal variances are assumed both in the Scheffe multiple 
comparison test and the ANOVA test. We here follow the description of Snedecor and 
Cochran (1967).  
With a estimates (weak, medium, strong) with a variance   
  and degrees of freedom    each, 
and a null hypothesis that each   
  is an estimate of the same   
 , the test estimator is  
   
 
 
 
with (a-1) degrees of freedom where 
      [ ∑       ̅
   ∑      
  ;   ̅  
∑    
 
∑  
  
    
 
      
[∑
 
  
 
 
∑  
] 
A weakness of the test is that it is very sensitive to non-normality in the data, particularly to 
kurtosis (Snedecor and Cochran, 1967).   
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Appendix D: WLS Assumptions 
The general assumptions in the WLS multiple regression are the following (Wooldridge, 
2009): 
1. There is a linear relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables, i.e. the model can be written as  
                        
Where   is an unobservable random error/disturbance term. 
2. The sample is random.  
3. None of the independent variables are constant, and there a perfect correlation 
between any of the independent variables (no perfect colinearity). 
4. The independent variables are exogenous (zero conditional mean): 
                  
5. The variance in the error term is constant (homoskedasticity):  
                   
  
6. The error term   is independent on the explanatory variables, and is normally 
distributed with zero mean and variance   ;           . 
These assumptions hold for the WLS equation if the same assumptions, with or without the 
homoskedasticity assumption, hold for the corresponding OLS equation. The sixth 
assumption, the normality assumption, is made in order to perform statistical inference based 
on the regressions (Wooldridge, 2009).  
Violation of the WLS assumptions can lead to biased estimators and incorrect standard 
deviations. Incorrect standard deviations give incorrect test statistics and can thus cause 
wrong conclusions; either the rejection of true null hypotheses (type I error) or the acceptance 
of false null hypotheses (type II error).  
Multicollinearity is not a direct violation of any of the WLS assumptions, but is a problem 
that occurs when there is high correlation between independent variables in the regression 
(Wooldridge, 2009). Although the reliability of the overall model is not affected, the 
interpretation of the regression coefficients is generally not very useful; the marginal effect of 
a specific variable cannot be evaluated since a variable cannot be held constant when 
changing a highly correlated variable (Freund et al., 2006). The multicollinearity problem can 
be solved by dropping one of the correlated variables.  
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Appendix F: Regression Diagnostics 
All the following tests are calculated in Stata version 12 (StataCorp, 2011), and use the work 
of Wooldridge (2009) as a reference. 
F.1. Variance Inflation Analysis 
This analysis tests for multicollinearity in the regressions. Any VIF values above 10, or 1/VIF 
below 0.1, indicate multicollinearity between explanatory variables.  
 
 
  
Regression
Indicator VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
Sales 4th Quartile 2.65 0.3780 2.26 0.4433 2.63 0.3807
Sales 3rd Quartile 2.49 0.4023 2.16 0.4634 2.55 0.3928
Sales 2nd Quartile 2.34 0.4266 2.06 0.4856 2.41 0.4150
Certification 1.74 0.5738 1.44 0.6942 1.44 0.6931 1.45 0.6903 1.71 0.5859 2.31 0.4321
Crude Oil Price, Brent 1.64 0.6100 1.19 0.8396 1.38 0.7249 1.39 0.7184 1.53 0.6522 1.49 0.6722 1.96 0.5107
LN of 12mth Press Hits 1.32 0.7598 1.2 0.8345 1.22 0.8207 1.25 0.8032 1.27 0.7874 1.29 0.7741 1.38 0.7224
Polluting Industry 1.50 0.6646 1.40 0.7147
Strong 1.32 0.7578 1.11 0.8991 1.14 0.8808 1.21 0.8298 1.24 0.8083 1.36 0.7368
Sweden 1.27 0.7901 1.11 0.9008
M/B 1.24 0.8054 1.22 0.8190
Award 1.27 0.7888 1.14 0.8769 1.16 0.8640 1.24 0.8079 1.18 0.8446 2.14 0.4665
Medium 1.15 0.8693 1.11 0.8997 1.12 0.8954 1.14 0.8785 1.13 0.8812 2.52 0.3971
Medium*Award 2.78 0.3603
Medium*Certification 2.05 0.4885
Sweden*Oil Price 1.58 0.6313
Atea - Firm Dummy 1.35 0.7393
Forte
Sweden*LN of 12mth Press Hits
Average VIF 1.66 1.15 1.30 1.25 1.29 1.61 2.08
(6)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7)
Regression
Indicator VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
Sales 4th Quartile 2.58 0.3873 2.59 0.3858 2.47 0.4052 2.72 0.3677 2.25 0.4449 2.52 0.3973 2.27 0.4411
Sales 3rd Quartile 2.54 0.3939 2.56 0.3900 2.45 0.4074 2.43 0.4110 2.10 0.4762 2.35 0.4256 2.10 0.4758
Sales 2nd Quartile 2.38 0.4194 2.44 0.4096 2.26 0.4423 2.34 0.4274 2.06 0.4861 2.29 0.4373 2.06 0.4861
Certification 1.76 0.5673 2.31 0.4331 1.74 0.5749 1.82 0.5501 1.76 0.5675 2.22 0.4509 1.77 0.5638
Crude Oil Price, Brent 1.93 0.5188 1.56 0.6393 1.56 0.6423 1.58 0.6315 1.47 0.6825 1.50 0.6684 1.47 0.6825
LN of 12mth Press Hits 1.38 0.7239 1.38 0.7261 1.38 0.7239 1.31 0.7612 1.28 0.7790 1.37 0.7316 1.33 0.7528
Polluting Industry 1.44 0.6927
Strong 1.36 0.7374 1.37 0.7313 1.34 0.7484
Sweden 1.26 0.7964
M/B 1.21 0.8246
Award 2.06 0.4863 1.27 0.7875 1.94 0.5159 1.24 0.8063 1.17 0.8576 1.24 0.8079 1.62 0.6185
Medium 1.86 0.5384 1.37 0.7308 1.85 0.5393
Medium*Award 2.46 0.4059 2.46 0.4065 1.50 0.6663
Medium*Certification 1.82 0.5506 1.73 0.5791
Sweden*Oil Price 1.58 0.6336
Atea - Firm Dummy 1.35 0.7394 1.33 0.7526 1.28 0.7799
Forte 1.13 0.8839 1.09 0.9197 1.28 0.7809 1.10 0.9075
Sweden*LN of 12mth Press Hits 1.35 0.7417 1.3 0.7716
Average VIF 1.94 1.78 1.88 1.68 1.65 1.78 1.69
(13) (14)(8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
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F.2. Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Chi^2 0.14 1.82 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.24 
P-value 0.7110 0.1771 0.7067 0.9738 0.9379 0.6214 
Regression (7) (8) (9) (10)     
Chi^2 0.90 1.13 0.45 0.78     
P-value 0.3424 0.2883 0.5030 0.3670     
Regression (11) (12) (13) (14)     
Chi^2 0.74 0.26 0.24 0.19     
P-value 0.3879 0.6113 0.6263 0.6619     
 
This test checks whether there are any problems with the assumption of homoscedasticity 
(constant variance in the error term) in the regression models. All p-values are well above any 
significance level of 10%, leading us to conclude that the assumption is not violated. 
 
F.3. Ramsey RESET test of Omitted Variables 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
F-statistic 0.69 0.36 0.98 0.27 0.17 0.22 
P-value 0.5582 0.7844 0.4054 0.8488 0.9171 0.8802 
Regression (7) (8) (9) (10)     
F-statistic 0.65 0.79 0.91 0.63     
P-value 0.5861 0.5027 0.4398 0.5954     
Regression (11) (12) (13) (14)     
F-statistic 0.88 0.59 0.32 0.18     
P-value 0.4548 0.6233 0.8079 0.9064     
 
The Ramsey RESET test looks for omitted variables, i.e. explanatory variables not included 
which may help explain more of the variance in the dependent variable. Also here all p-values 
are well above the weakest of acceptable significance levels, and we cannot prove that there 
are omitted variables.  
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F.4. Shapiro-Wilk Test for Normality of Residuals 
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z 
res1 115 0.9819 1.677 1.156 0.124 
res2 115 0.9780 2.045 1.599 0.055 
res3 115 0.9829 1.590 1.037 0.150 
res4 115 0.9816 1.709 1.198 0.115 
res5 115 0.9803 1.830 1.351 0.088 
res6 115 0.9826 1.618 1.076 0.141 
res7 115 0.9791 1.937 1.478 0.070 
res8 115 0.9792 1.933 1.473 0.070 
res9 115 0.9809 1.775 1.282 0.100 
res10 115 0.9763 2.202 1.764 0.039 
res11 115 0.9764 2.188 1.750 0.040 
res12 115 0.9774 2.103 1.662 0.048 
res13 115 0.9774 2.100 1.658 0.049 
res14 115 0.9755 2.277 1.839 0.033 
 
The assumption that the residuals (res # of regression) are normally distributed is an important 
one in a multiple regression. Shapiro-Wilk allows us to test this formally, and we can see 
from the table that several of the regressions have a p-value (Prob>z) of less than 5%, 
indicating that the residuals are in fact not normally distributed.  
 
 
 
 
